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„The Quarterly Report on Inflation“ is published by the National
Bank of Hungary with the aim of providing the general public with
regular information on the current and expected state of inflation
as well as the Bank’s interpretation of macroeconomic develop-
ments determining inflation. Wider access to information on
monetary policy objectives is expected to lead to a better under-
standing of the Bank’s policy responses.
The goal of this publication is to describe and interpret the develop-
ments of the preceding quarter.1
  
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The National Bank of Hungary’s policy target is to achieve price stability and a sustainable declinein inflation. Predictability and moderate interest rates, concomitant with a low inflation environ-
ment, are both factors which facilitate long-term, rapid economic growth. Achievement of the infla-
tion target is assisted by an exchange rate regime based on a pre-announced crawling peg. This sys-
tem promotes a nominal path which poses no risk to external balance, while ensuring convergence
of the domestic inflation rate towards the level of Hungary’s main trading partners.
The third quarter of 2000 continued to be dominated by adverse inflationary shocks, with inertial
effects also playing an increasing role. The main factor to blame for the upsurge in inflation is the
sharp rise in (non-processed) food prices in the wake of regional supply shocks at the end of last
summer. Another reason for the adverse developments is that the rapid rise in imported energy
prices, which started one and a half years ago, has been incorporated into consumer prices after the
appropriate lags. As a result of these effects, the twelve-month consumer price index (CPI) returned
to the double-digit range once again in September, and rose to 10.4% in October. Although the in-
crease in the CPI was primarily caused by one-off factors that are exogenous to monetary policy, the
rise in core inflation seen since July also reflected an increase in the trend of inflation. The core CPI
calculated by the National Bank of Hungary removes the effects on inflation of seasonal foodstuffs,
petrol and certain energy and regulated prices, in an effort to monitor changes in the components that
have a long-term impact on inflation. Following the 7% low measured in June, this core index rose to
9.6% in October.
In view of the fact that international economic forecasts do not predict that inflationary shocks
(such as energy and food price shocks and the weakness of the euro) on the scale experienced during
2000 will occur again next year, the current rise in inflation will probably remain a temporary phe-
nomenon.
The third-quarter rise in imported inflation also contributed to the strengthening of unfavour-
able inflationary pressures, as reflected in a 15% rise in the import unit value index. Again, this was
partly due to energy price rises, but there was also a considerable simultaneous increase in the infla-
tionary pressure experienced by Hungary’s main trading partners. The rise in inflation, however, was
lower than that seen in Hungary, which pushed up the differential relative to the euro area to 7.8 per-
centage points. This unwelcome development was primarily due to the fact that the impact of an in-
crease in food prices in the euro-area countries is dampened by regulation, but the higher weight of
energy in the Hungarian consumer basket was another factor. In respect of commodities that are di-
rectly disciplined by the exchange rate path (such as industrial goods), the inflation differential re-
mained at the level seen in the previous quarter.
In contrast to the previous year, regulated prices changes appeared to assist disinflation. In the
category of services with regulated prices, accounting for 9% of the consumer basket, prices rose at a
rate of 7.2% in October – a much slower pace than market services (11.9%). At the same time, eco-
nomic policy considerably dampened the impact of imported energy prices on domestic consumer
prices, by allowing only of small portion of input cost increases in pipeline gas and public transport
prices to be passed on to households. This stifling of the price level together with the indirect
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cost-push of the oil price explosion, which will emerge after a long lag, may exert significant infla-
tionary pressure in the future.
Inertial effects are exerting increasingly greater influence over the course of inflation. This is re-
flected in private sector wage growth. The decline in inflation is being hampered by the fact that wage
growth did not slow relative to the previous period. This effect also fed through to services prices. In
addition, input price increases take a shorter time to feed through to services prices than rises in in-
dustrial goods prices, as the latter enjoy faster productivity growth and are directly disciplined by the
exchange rate. As price increases were not hampered on the demand side either, the rise in wages
and other costs were incorporated into services price growth, which was close to 12% in October. The
difference between market services and industrial goods prices rose to 7.2%.
GDP growth continued to decline in 2000 Q3, amounting to 4.6% according to preliminary fig-
ures. The rate of demand growth was primarily determined by a decline in net export growth. In addi-
tion to nearly flat export growth (at 20.6% of GDP), imports rose at a 4-percentage-point higher rate
than in the previous quarter, (at 16.4% and 20.2% of GDP in 2000 Q2 and Q3, respectively). Based on
the currently available data it remains unclear whether the higher import requirement is the result of
domestic demand or export growth. This is because it was predominantly intermediate goods im-
ports that expanded, which are used as input in both areas. Similarly to the second quarter, final con-
sumption in the third quarter rose by 3.3%, while investment growth dropped to 2.2%. Rise in inven-
tories contributed 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth, inclusive of measurement errors.
Buoyant external activity continued during the third quarter. Confidence indices and for-
ward-looking indicators equally suggest that the peak in aggregate demand growth experienced by
Hungary’s main trading partners is likely to have occurred during this quarter. Exports to the CEFTA
countries rose by 37%, outstripping export growth both to the developed countries (31%) and the EU
countries (29%). Export rates to the CIS countries remained flat. Due to a 3.1% deterioration in the
terms of trade caused by the increase in world prices for energy and commodities, the balance of
trade calculated in euro reflected a worse situation than the volume data. The increase in the season-
ally adjusted deficit on the customs-statistics-based balance of trade continued during the third quar-
ter.
Of the components of domestic demand, consumer spending continued to expand at a slower
pace than last year (3.6%), though still above income growth (operational income growth was 2.3% in
the year to the third quarter). The decline in consumer spending growth is likely to have been caused
by slower growth in pecuniary social benefits, as net earnings rose at an approximately 4% rate.
Credit-financed consumer spending remained flat during the quarter. The narrowing gap between
income and consumption growth rates led to a rise in the gross saving rate to 10.7%, up 0.8 percent-
age points on the previous quarter. Furthermore, the composition of gross saving also changed. The
inflation-adjusted financial saving rate of 4.9% exceeded both the rate for a year earlier (3.3%) and for
the previous quarter (3.1%). By contrast, the 6.4% investment rate was 1.3 percentage points down
on a year earlier, despite strong growth in building and property purchase loans. The unexpected up-
surge in financial savings was primarily due to one-off wage outflows, as well as increased caution
arising from the higher-than-expected inflation.
Whole-economy investment expanded by 2.2% relative to 1999 Q3, which fell short of both ex-
pectations and the rates for previous quarters. This slower investment growth could not be foreseen
in either industrial output or capacity utilisation changes, with the only telltale sign perhaps being
subdued growth in investment imports.
The SNA-based primary balance of the government improved by 1.0% of GDP relative to 1999
Q3; thus, the general government restricted demand to this extent. Although a considerable portion
of this fiscal tightening will not last and stems from the changing seasonality of expenditures, fiscal
policy is expected to remain tight for the year as a whole. This better-than-expected position is attrib-
utable to the effect of the automatic stabilizer, as stronger-than-expected growth and higher inflation
tend to boost fiscal revenues, while expenditures are nominally fixed. In respect of pension expendi-
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tures, accounting for nearly 70% of transfer payments, there will be a correction for the infla-
tion-induced loss in value during the fourth quarter.
As reflected in weak investment activity, so far faster economic growth has not run into capacity
shortages. Nevertheless, manufacturing capacity utilisation rose to over 81%, simultaneously with a
rise to over 10% in the proportion of companies reporting capacity shortages relative to prospective
orders. Potential labour use also increased. Employment growth to over 50%, induced by a 1.3% ex-
pansion in private-sector employment, and a parallel rise in total hours worked reflect steady, exten-
sive growth in the use of labour. The drop in unemployment to 6%, in addition to the lowest rate of
collective redundancies seen in the past few years and rising average hours worked, especially in
manufacturing, warn of tightness in labour reserves. The tight labour market is accompanied by high
nominal wage growth in the private sector. Although private-sector wage inflation tapered off some-
what in a quarter-on-quarter comparison, the 13.2% rate in the third quarter can be regarded as a sign
of nominal accommodation to the higher-than-expected inflation path. The increased wage bill was
covered by stronger manufacturing productivity and higher services price inflation. Although the
11.9% wage index in the public sector is somewhat above the announced rate, this is broadly due to
fiscal institutions’ wage rises funded from their own resources and to one-off extra sums in healthcare
paid in July.
The demand structure in the third quarter was conducive to equilibrium, as robust export
growth was accompanied by moderate domestic absorption. This, however, did not prove to be suffi-
cient to offset the price losses triggered by persistently high levels of external energy and oil prices,
boosting the country’s financing requirement to 3.4% of GDP. At the same time, this rise in the financ-
ing requirement could only partly be attributed to losses caused by deterioration in the terms of trade.
In 2000 Q3, nominal deterioration in the balance of trade was simultaneous with a capital outflow via
current forint transfers. The higher net position was due to the higher private sector financing re-
quirement as the public sector’s need for funds declined during the quarter.
There was a significant change in the composition of the private sector’s financing requirement
relative to the previous year. Households’ improved financing capacity, which was primarily due to
temporary factors, was accompanied by a higher corporate borrowing requirement. Although busi-
ness profitability continued to increase in an environment of robust economic growth, it fell short of
the rate of GDP growth, and adverse price effects and foreign residents’ profit repatriation worsened
companies’ financial position (as a proportion of fast-growing GDP).
These factors combined led to a deficit of EUR 126 million on the current account of the balance
of payments. Despite further improvement in the balance of services, the deteriorating trend in the
trade balance exerted downward pressure on the overall trend of real-economy transactions. The
balance of transfer payments also registered a rise in net income outflows linked to non-debt invest-
ments.
The third-quarter deficit on the current account of the balance of payments was financed by
waning non-debt-generating (EUR 92 million) net capital inflows, while financing by debt-type in-
vestments was characterised by net capital outflows. In respect of non-debt-generating items, net eq-
uity purchases within foreign direct investment and the acquisition of ownership stakes amounted to
EUR 320 million, as a result of an inflow of EUR 519 million and an outflow of EUR 199 million. This
greatly exceeded the deficit on current account in its own right. This, however, was offset by foreign
direct investment by Hungarian resident companies, at nearly EUR 200 million, which can be traced
back to one single exceptionally large transaction. Following a slowdown during the second quarter,
the private sector began to step up its borrowing again during the third quarter. Credit institutions pri-
marily used foreign-currency funds to increase financing loans to the corporate sector.
The strengthening of the inertial components of inflation and the development of labour-market
bottlenecks, still accompanied by rapid growth and a favourable corporate sector position, called for
the tightening of monetary conditions. Although the stronger real appreciation caused by rising infla-
tion tightened monetary conditions in the third quarter, the drop in forward-looking real interest rates
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was a major cause for concern. Therefore, the central bank made a proposal to the government to re-
place the exchange rate regime as a means of obtaining greater flexibility in dealing with the impact
on inflation of external price shocks. In the absence of an agreement with the government on the tim-
ing of the change, the Bank was left no other means of responding to the visible rise in inflation than
via interest rate policy. This is the background for the 100-basis-point rise in the benchmark rate on
October 11th. In order to control sterilization costs, the central bank also modified its sterilization in-
struments as of October 24th , in respect of the conditions of the two-week deposit facility. In terms of
the change, periodical availability was replaced by volume bidding as of October 31st. A volume ten-
der means that the Bank invites bids for deposits up to a pre-set amount. Central bank clients can then
make competitive bids, stating the rates of interest they are willing to accept, in view of the an-
nounced interest rate ceiling.
The 100-basis-point rise in the interest rate premium did not induce any interest-rate sensitive
capital inflow before the end of October, as international capital markets were characterised by nega-
tive investment sentiment about riskier investments (such as those in emerging markets). This
pushed up the required interest rate premium. External demand for forint investments and the inter-
est rate premium on the forint was dampened by the fact that the same period also saw a temporary
rise in euro yields. Speculative forint demand during the period under review was, in all likelihood,
curbed by the August 31st session of the Central Bank Council, which made it clear to the markets that,
contrary to previous expectations, there would be no cut in the rate of devaluation in the course of
2000. As, despite the higher interest rate premium, the speculative demand for forint investments re-
mained subdued, the forint’s exchange rate moved away from the strong edge of the band by an aver-
age of 30–40 basis points, which implies that the size and timing of the interest rate hike was justified.
The underlying factors in the significant rise in long-term market yields beginning from
mid-August were the rise in inflation expectations and the increase in the risk premium caused by
greater uncertainty. The September inflation figure and the central bank interest rate hike drew a
strong reaction from the government securities market, with the rise in short-term yields approximat-
ing the rise in the central bank rate, and that in yields with the longest terms to maturity at roughly 60
basis points. From end-October, the sharp rise in forint yields induced capital inflow on the govern-
ment securities market, which, however, was dampened by the weaker risk rating of emerging mar-
ket investment. Following a temporary phase in the aftermath of the interest rate hike, there was a
slight drop in long-term yields – especially those with maturities of up to 10 years – which reflects fa-
vourable changes in medium-to-long term inflation expectations during the period following the rise
in the interest rate.
The rise in central bank and market rates fed through to commercial bank rates as early as Octo-
ber. Interest rate transmission was fastest and most efficient in respect of corporate rates, while the
pass-through of the rise in market rates into household rates was smoothed by commercial banks
over a long period of time.
The slowdown in the real growth of monetary aggregates continued in 2000 Q3. In contrast to
the past two years, the asset structure of both the household and corporate sectors saw a shift towards
medium-to-long-term time deposits. Households seemed to give preference to assets outside M4
(such as shares, life insurance reserves, pension-fund savings), which reduced real growth in the
household components of monetary aggregates. By contrast, the weight of government securities
and, to a smaller extent, that of time deposits began to increase within corporate sector assets, at
the expense of liquid assets. Thus, real M3 and M4 growth outpaced that of the corporate component
of M1.
The third quarter witnessed a small rise in the net financing requirement of non-financial compa-
nies. While the volume of borrowing did not change significantly, there was an increase in the stock
of financial assets. However, in light of the much weaker-than-expected investment figures, this im-
provement fell short of the expected level. Thus, net positions suggest a drop in corporate-sector
profitability and/or an upsurge in the level of inventories.
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Main macroeconomic indicators
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Growth rate (at constant prices)
Percentage changes on a year earlier
GDP* 3.4 3.8 4.5 5.7 6.6 5.8 4.6
Of which: domestic absorption 5.3 4.2 2.4 4.8 5.7 3.7 4.5
– final consumption 4.3 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.0 3.2 3.3
= household consumption 4.5 5.0 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.5 3.6
– investment 8.0 3.9 –1.4 7.4 12.7 4.8 7.5
= fixed investment 5.7 6.1 3.6 7.5 7.0 5.5 2.2
Exports (GDP) 9.5 9.8 13.6 18.9 21.5 20.9 20.6
Imports (GDP) 12.9 10.2 9.3 16.6 18.9 16.4 20.2
Real effective exchange rate index**
On CPI basis 2.8 0.3 –3.5 –5.7 –3.1 –0.9 –1.2
On PPI basis 5.2 1.9 –2.5 –6.6 –6.1 –4.7 –5.5
On unit labour cost basis (on value-added basis) 6.4 5.0 4.7 3.2 4.3 4.6 3.7
On unit labour cost basis (on gross output basis) 8.5 6.5 7.3 6.5 10.1 11.7 11.5
Deficit As a percentage of GDP
General government deficit (cash flow basis))*** –9.5 –5.9 –4.4 –2.9 –4.5 –3.9 –2.4
General government primary balance*** –1.5 0.1 1.8 2.7 1.3 1.7 2.7
EUR billions
Current account balance –0.5 –0.6 –0.1 –0.8 –0.4 –0.5 –0.1
Foreign direct investment (net) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.4
Savings rate**** (%) 8.5 6.4 6.9 8.4 6.7 5.9 8.0
Unemployment rate + (%) 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.2
Wage inflation ++ (Same period a year earlier = 100 %) 15.3 16.3 14.5 14.6 11.6 13.4 12.8
Net average per capita income in real terms+++ (Same period a year earlier = 100 %) 5.0 5.0 3.6 3.8 2.1 3.2 2.7
* These entries are partially based on Bank estimates.
** Positive figures indicate real depreciation; nominal exchange rate indices are calculated with market exchange rates from 1995; deflators refer to the manufacturing industry
*** Estimated values, as there are no appropriate quarterly data for local governments.
**** Net financial saving of households as a percentage of total household income (not including the revaluation total due to exchange rate changes and other factors).
+ Based on the labour-market survey of the Central Statistical Office according to ILO standards; number of unemployed as a percentage of the active population; seasonally adjusted data.
++ Wage inflation is calculated by the National Bank, see June Report. As there is no consistent methodology by which to compute the index for the period prior to 1999, there are no figures for the years previous to
1999.
+++ National Bank estimate of net earnings of employees in companies employing at least five persons and for the entire fiscal sector, taking into account the effect of income tax changes.
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Summary
Main monetary indicators
1998 1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Inflation (CPI)** 16.4 14.2 12.5 10.3 9.3 9.1 10.9 11.2 9.6 9.1 10.3
Producer price index** 13.5 11.6 10.4 7.1 4.9 4.5 4.8 8.2 9.9 11.6 12.8
Devaluation rate of the forint’s central parity 12.9 12.2 11.4 10.3 9.4 8.4 7.5 6.5 5.9 5.0 4.3
Real growth of monetary aggregates**
Percentage changes on a year earlier
M0 1.7 3.3 3.7 5.8 8.5 7.9 3.9 11.5 6.2 5.1 6.0
M1 6.7 9.1 7.9 6.1 7.1 6.3 5.6 6.8 6.9 7.6 5.4
M3 2.3 4.0 4.6 4.4 8.0 7.1 5.0 4.3 5.0 4.2 3.0
M4 10.0 9.8 9.4 9.4 9.1 9.0 7.7 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.7
Real growth of the stock of lending by financial institutions**
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Corporate sector, foreign + domestic 13.1 14.5 16.4 11.2 13.4 10.8 7.0 13.4 17.3 22.6 24.0
Corporate sector, domestic 14.5 15.5 15.6 9.9 11.0 7.2 3.5 11.3 15.7 20.7 23.3
Household –11.4 –2.4 2.4 0.8 11.6 14.0 17.8 20.4 28.0 30.6 30.8
Interest rates (%)**
Reverse repo/two-week deposit*** 18.75 18.00 18.00 16.75 16.00 15.25 14.75 14.25 11.25 11.00 10.75
90-day Treasury bill 18.65 17.33 19.06 16.10 15.68 14.74 14.07 12.44 10.63 10.50 10.75
12-month Treasury bill 18.70 17.32 18.96 15.88 15.61 14.77 14.17 12.33 10.42 10.42 10.71
3-year Treasury bond 17.42 16.31 18.00 14.18 14.01 14.03 13.45 10.75 9.09 9.43 9.95
Budapest Stock Exchange (BUX) 8,656 7,806 4,571 6,308 5,490 6,486 6,747 8,819 10,000 8,318 8,270
Interest rate premium (bsp)**** 364 363 674 533 531 551 551 426 309 227 208
Conversion
Conversion, EUR millions 2,253 850 –1996 –175 313 239 1,211 1,043 1,466 79 815
Banking sector net foreign borrowing,+ EUR millions* 854 231 –617 –158 7 –173 151 312 707 8 464
Corporate sector net borrowing, ++ EUR millions* 384 –24 209 579 109 753 390 316 –199 –271 –308
* Based on methodology considerations, the Bank has retroactively revised the monthly balance of payments accounts, as well as certain entries for foreign-related assets and liabilities published for 1995–1999.
** At the end of the period, in respect of government securities, reference yields of the State Debt Management Centre.
*** The maturity of the reverse deposit facility was reduced from one month to two weeks as of January 8, 1999.
**** Interest rate premium: excess yield on three-month T-bill investment over the devaluation rate and foreign interest rates. The current devaluation rate was modified upon official announcement of the change.
+ Excluding privatisation revenues.
++ Including inter-company loans.
In 2000 Q3, the inflationary pressure first observed in the sec-ond quarter continued. The twelve-month consumer price in-
dex (CPI) returned to the double-digit range in September, and
reached 10.4% in October. The core inflation index calculated by
the Central Statistical Office (CSO) stood at 8.7% in October,
compared with the Bank’s core measure of 9.6%. August 1999
was the last time that the latter index reached such heights. It is
now clear that not only has the robust trend of disinflation in
progress up to 2000 Q1 come to a halt, but prices are again rising
at an accelerating pace, due to the inflationary shocks on the
economy. In contrast to the previous favourable trend, food
prices are no longer retarding the rise in the price level, but exert-
ing upward pressure, pushing up the twelve-month index to
14.1% in October. Annual price inflation of industrial goods, dis-
ciplined by the exchange rate path, has remained a little under
5% nearly uninterruptedly since April, and the annual index was
at 4.7% in October. By contrast, the market services price index,
which is primarily sensitive to domestic demand, has been on a
steady increase for six months now, with the annual index reach-
ing 11.9% in October. As a result of the global oil price explosion,
market-determined household energy prices as well as vehicle
fuel prices, rose at an over 25 % rate in the year to October.
In respect of goods with regulated prices, the twelve-month
inflation rate was only 7.0% in October, due to the government’s
price control efforts. Inflation in excisables excluding vehicle
fuel (alcohol and tobacco) remained in excess of 10%, standing
at 11.7% in October.
Prices that are highly exposed to idiosyncratic shocks (energy
and food) have been significantly affected by inflationary pres-
sures recently, especially compared with last year’s favourable
developments. Despite the government’s efforts to dampen the
unfavourable trend with the instruments at their disposal (such
as the stringent control of regulated prices), they have not been
able to neutralise the impact of input price increases and, in re-
spect of agriculture, the export demand shock. This impact may
be incorporated into inflation expectations, reflected in the slow
but steady rise in services price inflation, which is less strongly in-
fluenced by external factors and exchange rate policy.
1 Inflation convergence
The European Union has recently been affected by the sameinflationary shock as Hungary. Our main trading partners
also experienced significant upward pressure on consumer en-
ergy prices (leading to a 16% year-on-year rise in September),
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triggered by the oil price shock. However, this rise remained be-
low the Hungarian rate (24.4% in September and nearly 30% in
October). Food prices also rose at a slower pace than in Hungary
(by 2.2% in the year to October and 0.5% at the beginning of the
year). The latter difference was partly due to the price stabilizing
effect of the EU’s common agricultural policy, an effect which
has been much more efficient than in this country. The impact of
the inflationary shock on the euro area’s fairly stable services
price index has been strongly muffled: the 1.9% rise in October
was the result of a modestly rising trend from the 0.6% lower rate
a year earlier. With the price index of internationally traded in-
dustrial goods edging up, the 12-month index stood at 0.8% in
September, up 0.3 % on the figure for the middle of the year.
As a combined result of the above factors, the Eurostat’s har-
monised consumer price index (HICP) crept up to 2.8 % in the
euro area in September, in a year-on-year comparison. The com-
parable figure in Hungary was 10.6%. This made it clear that the
process of convergence, measured by the inflation differential,
was affected by an adverse change (see Chart I-1).
The factors to blame for the interruption of inflation conver-
gence include the fact that the energy and July food price shocks
had a stronger impact in Hungary (see Chart I-2). Energy-
producing materials are given smaller weight in the euro-area
consumer basket than in Hungary (household energy at 5.5%,
compared with 8.6% in Hungary; motor fuel at 4% and 4.9%, re-
spectively), similarly to food prices (16.7% and 19.1%, respec-
tively). Furthermore, food price swings had a much smaller am-
plitude in the euro area, thanks to more efficient market regula-
tion and lower price volatility on the larger market. Nevertheless,
the aforementioned factors fail to fully account for the adverse
developments seen over the past six months. Convergence was
also interrupted in terms of the indices excluding all major en-
ergy and food price effects, although the slight divergence seen
between the original harmonised price indices becomes less
clear now. The relationship between indices which exclusively
remove the effect of energy prices followed a similar trend to that
of the original harmonised price indices. Both the index calcu-
lated excluding all food, alcohol and tobacco, and the index only
excluding unprocessed foodstuffs reflect stronger convergence
as well as a later date for its interruption. The inflation differential
relating to industrial goods directly disciplined by the exchange
rate path remained at the level seen in the previous quarter. Con-
sequently, it cannot be said for certain whether the price indices,
i.e. the trend in inflation, have entered a divergent phase.
Incidentally, other Central and East European countries in a
similar situation to Hungary have also been unsuccessful in mak-
ing inflation rates converge (Chart I-3).
2 Imported inflation
In 2000 Q3, commodity prices excluding energy and energyprices changed in a different direction to that seen in the previ-
ous quarter (see Table I-1). Commodity prices in dollar terms
were 4% down on the previous quarter (the second quarter regis-
tered a drop of 2%). The decrease was due to a 5% to 8% decline
in food, beverages and agricultural raw material prices and a
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Table I-1 World market price levels in 1999–2000*
Percentage changes relative to the average for 1995
Per cent
1999 2000
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Commodities excluding
energy 74.5 75.2 78.1 79.4 77.9 74.8
Food 73.3 71.6 72.3 74.4 74.0 70.6
Beverages 73.4 65.3 74.9 68.1 63.2 58.7
Agricultural
raw materials 76.1 77.5 80.8 80.8 81.2 74.8
Metals 72.3 78.7 82.0 87.2 82.5 85.5
Crude oil 89.9 119.2 141.0 157.0 155.6 177.9
Source: IMF IFS
*World market prices in dollars.
3.6% rise in metal prices. At the same time, after a stable sec-
ond-quarter, energy and oil prices rose by over 14% during the
third quarter, despite the OPEC’s repeated quota increase in July.
This can be attributed to exceptionally low stock levels in the
United States, the largest user. In addition to the impact of
changes in world prices, Hungary was also affected by the 3.1%
average depreciation of the euro against the dollar which took
place during the third quarter.
In 2000 Q3, the import unit value index rose from 13.9% in the
previous quarter to 15.0%. This exceeded the pre-announced de-
valuation rate of the forint’s exchange rate by 10.5% and the de-
preciation in the nominal effective exchange rate index by 9.2%.
The 11% year-on-year growth in the indicator calculated with ef-
fective foreign prices1 was also above the index for the previous
quarter (see Chart I-4). These data suggest that imported infla-
tionary pressure did not moderate during the third quarter,
primarily as a result of the feed-through of the inflation trends
experienced by our main trading partners. Another factor is the
effect of last year’s low base-period values, in view of the fact that
short-term developments reflect a slightly different picture.
Quarter-on-quarter price inflation derived from the seasonally
adjusted import unit value index (see Chart I-5) implies that
imported inflationary pressure, although still a factor in the
Hungarian economy, has moderated somewhat. Imported
inflation seems to have peaked during the second quarter of
2000.
Prices for imports from developed countries continued to in-
crease in the third quarter, also spreading to machinery prices,
which had previously been growing at a more moderate rate. In
the third quarter prices in this product group rose by 8.9% in a
year-on-year comparison. This was most likely due to the fact
that rising energy prices and costs were beginning to feed
through to foreign producer prices at that time. It also seems
probable that this year’s growth in demand exerted upward pres-
sure on prices. Just as in the previous quarter, import prices from
Central and East Europe continued to rise, up by 41.5%, due pri-
marily to higher energy prices.In respect of price growth, energy
import prices continued to top the list in the third quarter, up by
83.9% on a year earlier. Food, beverage and tobacco import price
increases also gathered pace (10.4%). As in the second quarter,
machinery price rises (9.2%) exerted further imported inflation-
ary pressure. Imported inflation relating to processed goods and
commodities remained at the previous high, 12.2% and 20.1%,
rates, respectively. Clearly, the continuing third-quarter strength-
ening of imported inflationary pressure was equally due to im-
ported energy and machinery inflation. The latter is likely to have
been caused by positive demand shocks and rising costs.
This year, CPI inflation in the euro area was constantly in ex-
cess of the European Central Bank’s 2% medium-term target (see
Table I-2). The twelve-month rate hit a six-year peak of 2.8% in
September, compared with 2.1% in March and 2.4% in June. Price
inflation was primarily triggered by high energy prices and the
weakening euro, while CPI inflation excluding energy prices was
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constructed by multiplying the weighted average of the producer price indi-
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up by 1.6%. The highest rate of inflation was measured in Ireland
at over 6%, while the lowest rates were seen in Austria and
France, at 2.2% and 2.3%, respectively.
Twelve-month CPI inflation in the European Union countries
stood at 2.5% in September. In the United States, the peak of 3.7%
for CPI measured in March and June (the highest rate measured
in recent years) fell to 3.5% in September, while core inflation re-
mained at the end-of-July rate of 2.6%. So far the inflationary
pressure from high energy prices has been broadly offset by
rapid productivity growth from IT advances. The slowdown in
economic growth seen in the third quarter also exerts downward
pressure on inflation.
In September the twelve-month rate of inflation in the Czech
Republic held steady at the 4.1% rate measured in June. Accord-
ing to the different forecasts, despite stronger economic activity
and steady energy and food price increases, CPI inflation in De-
cember will be 4.4% at most. This year’s CPI inflation in Poland
remained virtually flat, at slightly above 10%, with a 10.3% rate in
September.
The inflation outlook for 2000 depends on the extent to which
the upward pressure exerted by food and fuel prices feeds
through to wage and services prices.
3 Components of changes
in consumer prices
Industrial goods
Changes in the prices of internationally traded industrialgoods play a prominent role from the aspect of monetary
policy. (We have modified the methodology used in previous Re-
ports in respect of the classification of industrial goods and mar-
ket services, see Box for more details). Due to international com-
petition, prices in this category are basically determined by the
prices of (potential) imports calculated in forints. Both foreign
and domestic prices in this category are fairly stable. Conse-
quently, changes in industrial goods prices convey high-quality
information on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
and the exchange rate path (see Table I-3).
Industrial goods prices, accounting for 26.7% of the consumer
basket, (see Chart I-6) increased at a favourable rate of 4.7% in
the year to October. Within this group, the twelve-month price
index of non-durables, accounting for 19.5% of the basket, rose
from 5.3% in July to 6% in October.
On the other hand, the price level of durable consumer goods,
with a basket-weight of 7.1%, remained basically stable, with the
twelve-month price index hardly in excess of 1%. During the au-
tumn, prices of the cultural items component continued the
downward trend which started in April.
The average rate of industrial goods price inflation was
only exceeded by that of building materials, included with the
item of owner occupied housing, due partly to increased energy
costs.
The Bank last reduced the devaluation rate of the forint in
April (from a monthly 0.4% to 0.3%), which was followed by an
announcement at the end of the summer that there would be no
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Table I-3 Inflation rate of different goods and services*
Relative to same month a year earlier
Per cent
Weight
in CPI
Dec.
1999
2000
March June July Aug. Sep. Dec.
Consumer Price
Index (CPI) 100.0 11.2 9.6 9.1 9.6 9.6 10.3 10.4
Of which:
Industrial
products,
excluding
food, alcohol,
tobacco
and petrol** 26.7 6.5 5.2 4.3 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.7
Petrol 4.9 37.8 36.7 33.4 27.9 24.2 25.9 26.7
Non-regulated
household
energy prices 1.3 16.5 12.7 17.6 21.5 22.7 24.4 29.2
Food 19.1 5.4 5.6 6.4 11.8 14.4 15.3 14.1
Regulated
prices 18.0 17.6 10.9 9.4 7.2 5.0 6.5 6.9
Of which: energy 7.3 6.2 5.1 5.5 4.8 6.3 7.9 8.8
Services 9.0 18.7 8.8 5.6 5.5 5.5 7.2 7.2
Market services 20.6 10.8 10.2 10.3 10.5 10.7 11.4 11.9
Alcohol and
tobacco 9.4 10.6 11.7 10.5 9.9 10.5 10.7 11.2
Core inflation 89.9 8.8 7.5 7.0 7.4 8.5 9.4 9.6
Depreciation of
the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate 2.7 4.1 6.2 6.0 5.7 5.6 5.4
Pre-announced
nominal devalua-
tion of the forint 6.7 6.0 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.3
* The classification of items included in the consumer basket is different from that applied
by the Central Statistical Office. See the Bank’s Quarterly Inflation Reports for more details.
** We have modified the methodology used in previous Reports in respect of the classifica-
tion of industrial goods and market services (see Box for more details).
Table I-2 International inflation data, 1999–2000
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Per cent
March 2000 June 2000 September 2000
Producer Consumer Producer Consumer Producer Consumer
price changes
United States 4.5 3.7 4.8 3.7 3.3 3.5
Japan n/a –0.6 n/a –0.7 n/a n/a
Germany 2.1 2.1 2.9 1.9 4.3 2.6
Czech Republic 5.1 3.8 5.0 4.1 5.4 4.1
Poland 7.3 10.3 8.7 10.2 8.3 10.3
Hungary 9.9 9.6 12.0 9.1 12.8 10.3
EU-11 6.2 2.1 5.6 2.4 n/a 2.8
EU-15 n/a 1.9 n/a 2.1 n/a 2.5
Source: Global Data Watch, J.P. Morgan’s figures for 2000.
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Chart I-6 Industrial goods prices
further cut for the remainder of the year. Thus, the halt in
tradables inflation is not in contradiction with the exchange rate
path, which is reflected in the fact that relative twelve-month in-
flation of industrial goods, as compared to the rate of devalua-
tion, although slightly rising, continued to remain within the  1 %
range2 (see Chart I-7). This implies that the pre-announced ex-
change rate path is continuing to act as a nominal anchor.
Energy price shock
The Hungarian economy has recently been hit by two significant
inflationary shocks. First, energy (oil and natural gas) prices have
been rising sharply at a nearly uninterrupted pace for one and a
half years; and second, there was an upsurge in food prices at the
end of the summer.
The monthly average price of a barrel of Brent in euro terms
increased over 4.5-fold from the December 1998 low. The price
of natural gas imported by Hungary is linked to the world price
for oil, following it with a nine-month lag in a smoothed way, as a
result of a contract, which is quite unfavourable under the pres-
ent circumstances.
The latter factor deserves special attention, as the Hungarian
use of natural gas outstrips oil consumption (in terms of heating
value equivalence). In other countries rises in the price of im-
ported natural gas do not follow – at least in the short run – oil
price inflation. This means that Hungary was hit by an especially
high-amplitude energy price shock, even in international com-
parison.
As, however, world oil prices have been going up for one and
a half years now, and the incorporation of gas price increases
into inflation was in fact prevented by the government with ad-
ministrative measures, the shock probably did not directly speed
up third-quarter inflation, relative to previously. Thus, the
mid-year adverse reversal in disinflation cannot be attributed to a
direct impact of energy price explosion.
It can be seen from Chart I-8 that the oil price shock had the
strongest impact on the Hungarian economy in 1999 Q4. The
63.5% rate of year-on-year price inflation seen in 2000 Q3 was no
‘novelty’ as for the past six quarters energy import prices have
been rising at a year-on-year rate of above 60%.
The last one and a half years have seen a steady year-on-year
rise of 30% and 50% in motor fuel and bottled gas prices, account-
ing for 5% and 0.5% of the consumer basket, respectively. Mar-
ket-determined energy and motor fuel prices rose at an annual
rate of 25.7% over the past one and a half years (in October 2000,
the combined twelve-month price index stood at 27.2%). Due to
the 6.3% weight of this category in the consumer basket, the
twelve-month rate of inflation rose by 1.6–1.7% over the last one
and a half years on account of this product category alone, as a
direct impact of the oil price shock. This impact can be regarded
as temporary because if oil prices and the associated gas prices
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Chart I-8 Changes in energy import prices in forint
terms
2 The change in the methodology reduced the figure for relative inflation by
0.5–0.7%. Under the former methodology, industrial goods’ relative inflation
would have slightly exceeded 1%.
even just stabilize at the current level, this will reduce the rate of
inflation by the same percentage.
As far as the direct inflationary effect of energy prices is con-
cerned (see Chart I-9), there is a conspicuously widening gap be-
tween centrally controlled and market-set energy price indices
within the household energy category (up by 8.8% and 29.2%, re-
spectively, in a year-on-year comparison). Market-priced en-
ergy, with a weight of 1.3%, has followed the world market trend.
Prices of solid fuels (such as coal, briquette and firewood) rose
by 13–18% over the twelve months. Oil and gas import prices
also went up sharply in the third quarter.
This almost immediately fed through to the price for bottled
gas, pushing its price up one-and-a-half times during the course
of one year.
The control mechanism of centrally regulated energy prices,
accounting for 7.2% of the basket, resulted in a 12% rise in the
price for natural gas (and a linked 5% increase in district heating)
as of July 1st. This proved to be far insufficient to offset the rise in
import costs. In an effort to relieve tensions on the gas market,
the government raised gas prices for large users by 43% as of No-
vember. This measure does not directly affect household costs
(even district heating prices remaining unchanged), but it is
likely to exert indirect inflationary pressure, with November and
December being the earliest time when the feed-through would
be reflected in the price indices. Higher energy costs may be
passed on to product prices, and the extra costs incurred by
electricity production, the chief user of energy input, would ac-
count for a relatively large rise in electricity prices in January. In
October, the 8.8% twelve-month rise in centrally controlled
household energy prices was below the rise in the general price
level.
Thus, the direct impact of imported energy price rises on do-
mestic consumer prices was considerably dampened by eco-
nomic policy to the extent that only a small portion of the in-
crease in input costs was allowed to be passed on to household
prices by the central setters of pipeline gas and public transport
prices. (Freezing the excise duty content of motor fuel prices is
intended to serve a similar anti-inflationary objective in the fu-
ture.) This kind of ‘stifling’ of a rise in the price level together with
the oil price explosion, which is expected to boost costs indi-
rectly and after a long lag, may become important inflationary
factors.
Food price shock
The unexpected jump in July in the prices of unprocessed food-
stuffs (accounting for 5.4% of the basket) supplied the other cru-
cial inflationary shock for the economy (see Chart I-10). The sea-
sonally adjusted index rose by 14.4% in the course of one month.3
This shock fed through to processed foodstuffs (with a 13.8%
weight) after a lag and significantly dampened. The seasonally
adjusted price level of this sub-category rose by 1.25%, 2.81% and
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3 In July 2000, unprocessed foodstuff prices rose by 11.3% on average, al-
though thanks to seasonal effects prices for unprocessed foodstuffs normally
fall during this month. There were exceptional rises in pork and eggs prices.
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Chart I-9 Changes in energy prices
3.20%, on a monthly basis, in July, August and September, re-
spectively. As a consequence, the 12-month index for food
reached the 12–15% range in the third quarter, compared with
6–7% a year earlier, and the year-on-year index in October de-
clined only to 14.1%. Thus, rather than remaining below the over-
all rate of CPI inflation, food prices have risen at a significantly
higher rate than previously.
As is shown in Chart I-10, the rise in food prices occurring late
in the summer did not only cause a one-off shift in the price level
in line with expectations, but was partially corrected as early as
by August in respect of unprocessed foodstuffs. Thus, the shock
is not expected to exert lasting upward pressure on inflation. The
jump in the price of unprocessed foodstuffs in July, due primarily
to the marked expansion of the export taking capacity of East Eu-
ropean markets was built into processed food prices after a lag of
one or two months. However, even in respect of the latter cate-
gory, the seasonally adjusted monthly price index shows signs of
a correction.
Food, especially unprocessed foodstuffs, constitutes one of
the least stable categories of the consumer price index. Its con-
siderable short-term volatility and unstable seasonality obstruct
statistical analysis and render related forecasting rather unreli-
able. It is vital, therefore, that in the assessment of inflation trends
the ‘distorting’ effect of food prices on overall consumer price in-
dices should be taken into account to the greatest possible ex-
tent.
Market services
It is a lingering cause for concern that the price index of market
services is exceeding the tradables price inflation to an ever in-
creasing degree (see Chart I-11). In contrast to industrial goods
prices, which are controlled by the exchange rate path, under the
current system, monetary policy can only influence inflation in
market services prices to a limited degree. The cornerstone of ex-
change-rate-based disinflation lies in the capability of the econ-
omy’s complex equilibrium mechanisms to influence non-
tradable prices, structurally ‘protected’ from international com-
petition, ensuring that they change consistently with import
prices over the long term.
Prices of market services rose nearly 7.2% faster than the ag-
gregate price for industrial goods in the year to October, though
the quarter-on-quarter (seasonally adjusted index) suggests that
the opening of the ‘price gap’ came to a halt during the third quar-
ter. According to calculations by National Bank analysts, the
varying rate of productivity growth across the various sectors ac-
counts for a 4–6% inflation differential over the long term, given
the current stage of economic convergence. This implies that the
7% change in the price ratio, characteristic of the first ten months,
is hardly sustainable.
The problem is rooted in the fact that the twelve-month price
index of market services, with a weight of 20.2%, has been on a
steady rise since the third quarter, remaining just below 12% in
October.
In the following section the notions of food price shock and
wage inflation inertia are to be investigated by dividing market
services into three groups. These are 1) the food-price-sensitive
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Chart I-11 Inflation in respect of major aggregates
group,4 with a 4% weight, 2) wage-sensitive5 services, which are
highly labour-intensive and account for 9% of the consumer bas-
ket, and 3) other6 items, with a weight of 7.2%, i.e. market services
that have remained outside the former two groups.
Chart I-12 shows that the food-sensitive group was keenly af-
fected by the July food price shock. The twelve-month index of
the wage-sensitive group rose significantly during September
and October, but this does not necessarily signal a long-term
trend, two months being too short a period to draw far-reaching
inferences. At least labour market data do not seem to confirm
any acceleration in wage inflation within this sector.
Excisables and goods
with regulated prices
In respect of excisables, with a 14.1% weight, the previous trend
continued (see Chart I-13).
Prices for alcohol and tobacco, accounting for 9.1% of the con-
sumer basket, rose by 11.2% in the year to October, which ex-
ceeded the rise in the headline CPI. This was partly due to the in-
crease in the excise duty content of tobacco prices early in the
year7 and partly to higher import prices at mid-year, which trig-
gered an over 3% increase during the period from July to Octo-
ber. Wine prices rose by 13% over one year, 5% of which took
place after July. The factors to blame for this above-average in-
crease include the introduction of excise regulations during the
first half of the year, the pass-on of the resulting costs to prices
and the contraction of the black market. The rate of excise duty
payable on wines was officially introduced in August (5 forints
per litre).
In respect of petrol, the increase in the excise duty would have
resulted in a rise in price which would have been less than 4%.
Nevertheless, as a result of the extremely high world price for oil
(in dollars) and the weakness of the euro (and the linked forint)
against the dollar, petrol prices rose at an exceptionally high rate
of nearly 27% over the past twelve months. Despite several pre-
dictions of an interruption in the increase of world market prices
during the year, this did not occur, and fuel price inflation in the
autumn was virtually the same as in summer. Due to the 4.9%
weight of petrol, this led to a roughly one percent ‘unanticipated’
rise in the twelve-month rate. Nevertheless, in the course of No-
vember petrol prices dropped by 3 forints on two occasions, the
impact of which is likely to be reflected in the CPI at the end of the
year.
The anti-inflationary impact of the strict central pricing policy
was not only felt in respect of regulated household energy prices,
but throughout the entire category of regulated prices as well (see
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Chart I-13 Excisable goods prices
4 The food-price-sensitive group comprises restaurant and canteen, school
and kindergarten/crèche meals, and buffet goods, as well as – due to the statis-
tical properties of the stratum – domestic holidays without a voucher.
5 The wage-sensitive category comprises clothes, household appliances, home
improvement and vehicle repair, cleaning/laundry, beauty services, health
and education, maintenance of cultural items, as well as espresso coffee.
6 This category includes the items that have been left out of the two special
groups, such as newspapers/periodicals, books, textbooks, apartment block
service charge, car rental, taxi, haulage, theatre, cinema, sports events, holi-
day abroad, photographic supplies and the rest of (unlisted) services.
7 As reported in the June issue, specific excise duty rose by 15%, which raised
prices within this category by about 6% in its own right.
Table I-4). As a result of last year’s modification of the system of
subsidies, pharmaceuticals prices surged, the protracted impact
of which was still felt during the summer. Prices in this category
only rose by 3.2% during the ten months to October. This was
due to the government’s June measure of fixing prices for
180 days8 and launching negotiations with manufacturers and
distributors seeking to agree on a price strategy for the period
2000–2003. The government’s aim is to keep producer and im-
port prices unchanged during this year and, over the forthcom-
ing years, to confine pharmaceuticals price inflation to below
70% of the projected rate of inflation. The low pharmaceuticals
price index played a key role in narrowing the gap (by one per-
centage point) between core inflation and the CPI during the au-
tumn.
The twelve-month price index of regulated services, account-
ing for 9% of the consumer basket, was much lower in October
(7.2%) than that of the market services (11.9%). The timing of
price changes across the year differed from the trend seen in pre-
vious years. The subdued rate of increase can be undoubtedly at-
tributed to the fact that rises in centrally controlled prices – for
transport and communications – did not exceed the planned tar-
get of 6%. In general there was only one change in the centrally
regulated service prices, in the course of February and March.
This triggered cost-side tension on account of transport services
as the pre-agreed rise in the charges failed to cover the costs in-
curred by higher-than-expected fuel prices. This year the mea-
sure of inflation relating to telephone services followed a different
trend to that seen previously. The ‘price cap’ set on the house-
hold service price index stood at 6%, and the spring index re-
flected changes that were in accordance with this regulation.
However, the launching of various discount packages during the
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Table I-4 Centrally regulated or influenced prices *
Year-on-year and ten-month (in 2000) growth rates**
Per cent
Weight
in
2000
Twelve-month price indices Ten-month price indices
Difference in
percentage
points
1999 2000
1999 2000 1999–2000
December March June July August September October
Controlled prices 17.99 17.6 10.9 9.4 7.2 5.0 6.5 6.9 18.1 7.4 –10.7
Goods 8.99 16.4 13.2 13.7 9.0 4.5 5.8 6.5 17.6 7.6 –10.0
Of which:
Household energy 7.29 6.2 5.1 5.5 4.8 6.3 7.9 8.8 6.1 8.6 2.6
Central and district heating 1.84 6.0 5.8 6.3 6.6 7.1 7.5 9.6 10.1 6.3 –3.7
Electricity 3.29 10.1 7.4 7.8 7.7 6.7 6.3 6.3 1.1 12.0 10.9
Gas supplied through pipes 2.16 1.1 1.0 1.4 –1.2 5.0 10.6 12.0 6.1 8.6 2.6
Pharmaceuticals, medical products 1.70 56.9 42.9 43.5 22.0 –1.0 –-0.9 –1.0 63.5 3.2 –60.3
Services 9.00 18.7 8.8 5.6 5.5 5.5 7.2 7.2 18.6 7.1 –11.5
Of which:
Housing 2.48 15.3 13.7 12.3 12.3 12.1 12.0 12.1 15.0 11.9 –3.1
Transport 1.89 13.4 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 13.4 6.3 –7.1
Communications 3.78 25.3 6.6 2.1 2.1 2.0 6.0 6.0 25.3 6.0 –19.3
* Television subscription fees, carrying a 0.66% weight in the consumer price index, have been divided into a centrally regulated portion (0.31%) and a market subscription fee (0.36%). Regulated prices include only
the former component, which has not changed since last year.
** Due to rounding, sums do not always add up accurately.
8 Until December 26th.
summer provided an incentive for using fixed-line telephones,
pushing the twelve-month price index down to below 2%.9 But
when the period of these special discount rates came to an end in
the autumn, the prices returned to the level seen in the spring, re-
flected in a 4% rise in September.
The annual rate of inflation relating to houses and flats owned
by local authorities stood at 12%. The extra costs incurred herein
were largely passed on to consumer prices, and rents continued
to edge up during the autumn (see Chart I-14).
In order to illustrate the disinflationary effect of the moderate
price increases in the regulated services category, we have com-
pared only increases that are ‘newcomers’ in the current year,
rather than the twelve-month rates of price level change.10
Regulated price changes that were newcomers this year were
nearly 11 percentage points lower than those last year. This, in
turn, reduced this year’s rate of inflation by nearly 2 percentage
points.
4 Core inflation
The Bank describes the trend of inflation in terms of a core in-flation index calculated using the Bank’s own methodology.
The differences between core inflation and the overall consumer
price index are listed in Table I-5. In October, the core inflation
index stood at 9.6%, thanks primarily to a one-off jump in unpro-
cessed food prices, the effect of which is only partially removed
from the index. Nevertheless, the stubborn increase in the ser-
vices price index warns of the danger of inflation inertia and
the associated long-term interruption in disinflation (see Chart
I-15).
In addition to the CPI, the Central Statistical Office also pub-
lishes a core inflation index, excluding unprocessed foodstuffs
(whereas the Bank’s core inflation only filters out the effects of
items that are statistically highly problematic and have unstable
seasonality). In the third quarter the annual indices calculated by
the CSO and the Bank “traded places”, i.e. in contrast to the past,
the CSO’s core inflation index has remained below the Bank’s
since August. This is partly due to the fact that, as they were ex-
cluded, unprocessed foodstuffs did not raise the relative level of
the CSO’s index, whereas the index fell thanks to last year’s high
base-period values relating to pharmaceuticals prices, which are,
in turn, excluded from the Bank’s index. Accordingly, the CSO’s
annual index stood at 8.7% in October (see Table I-6).
24 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
I. Inflation
9 The timing was partly due to a provision in the measure stating that should
the August/December telephone service price index exceed the prescribed
rate as recorded in the Central Statistical Office’s August CPI statistics, then
telephone charges would have to be reduced in order to comply with the regu-
lation.
10 See final three columns of Table I-4.
Table I-5 Components of the NBH core inflation and the consumer price
index
Per cent
Aug./Aug. Sep./Sep. Oct./Oct.
Unprocessed foodstuffs 0.50 0.25 0.09
Household energy + vehicle fuels 0.90 0.93 0.96
Pharmaceuticals –0.25 –0.26 –0.26
Total 1.15 0.91 0.79
CPI 109.6 110.3 110.4
NBH core inflation 108.5 109.4 109.6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Local governments
Central government
Mixed
1999 2000
Chart I-14 Breakdown of regulated price levels
according to regulating authority
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
CPI
Core NBH
Core CSO
1999 2000
Per centPer cent
Chart I-15 Comparison of core inflation indices
and the CPI
Table I-6 Components of the NBH core inflation and the consumer price
index
Weight in CPI Aug./Aug. Sep./Sep. Oct./Oct.
Pharmaceuticals 1.7 –0.26 –0.27 –0.27
Energy 7.8 –0.01 –0.09 –0.22
Unprocessed food 3.1 –0.56 –0.51 –0.47
Total –0.83 –0.87 –0.95
CSO core inflation 80.5 107.6 108.5 108.7
NBH core inflation 89.7 108.5 109.4 109.6
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Box I-1 Changes in the classification methodology of industrial goods and market-priced services
The Central Statistical Office (CSO) gives nearly 6% weight to the imputed price of owner occupied housing (OOH)
(stratum 611). This stratum is intended to monitor changes in capital costs, i.e. the ‘consumer price’ of housing. This
item should not be confused with changes in the maintenance costs of flats and houses, which are represented in the
statistics by the items of articles of home improvement and maintenance (stratum 510) and home improvement and
maintenance (stratum 613), with weights of 0.6% and 1.5%, respectively. The representation of OOH in the CPI raises
a number of theoretical difficulties. (For detailed discussion of this subject, see Ferenczi-Valkovszky-Vincze: What
are Consumer Price Statistics Good for?; NBH Working Paper Series, 5/2000.)
According to the methodology used by the CSO, the weight of the ‘rent’ of OOH (stratum 611), is estimated as a ser-
vice, using the household panel statistics, and the price index is given as the arithmetical mean of the other two hous-
ing-related price indices (stratum 510 and 613). This technique is probably based on the implicit assumption that the
price index for the ‘correct rent’ of owner-occupied houses and flats is identical to the inflation of replacement costs
(i.e. the construction cost of newly built houses and flats). The latter, in turn, can be approximated with a price index
which is a half-and-half mixture of building material and construction service price indices.
The use of this technique implies that households’ property investment is regarded as an element of current con-
sumption, even though the above-described method is clearly biased. In this case, however, the item of OOH (stra-
tum 611), which is given a rather large weight, cannot be regarded as either an industrial good or a market service.
Previously, due to the statistical behaviour of this stratum, this item was purely regarded as an industrial good (see
page 20, December 1999 issue of the Report). Based on the CSO’s above-described procedure and the accompanying
reasoning, it would seem more expedient to ‘split’ the item up into the original two strata, as this is what actually hap-
pens when the weight of the items of articles for home improvement and maintenance (stratum 510) and home im-
provement and maintenance (stratum 613) is in effect raised by 3%, as a result of imputing the OOH cost index. In
practice this means that the original CSO weights are modified as presented in Table I-7. (Naturally, this is not only
done to the weights for 2000, but also to the others retroactively.)
Table I-7
Original weights Corrected weights
510 Articles for home improvement and maintenance 0,623 3,602
611 Owner occupied housing 1,530 4,509
613 Home improvement and maintenance 5,958 0
This modification affects the industrial goods and market services categories, as well as the calculation of the time
series based on them. What in fact happens in the course of the correction is that the ‘half’ of stratum 611 which be-
longs to stratum 613 and which nonetheless previously was included with industrial goods, is transferred into the
market service category corresponding to stratum 613. The effect of the methodology change is illustrated in Charts
I-16 and I-17.
It is clear from the charts that the price index for home improvement and maintenance (stratum 613) is generally
below the price index for services, but is typically higher than the price index for industrial goods. Consequently, the
transfer of a ‘service’11 accounting for nearly 3% of the consumer basket into market services results (typically) in the
confusing outcome of reducing the value of both the services and the industrial goods indices.
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11 Remember that stratum 611 is an imputed item, thus its 50% service content
can only be regarded as an actually consumed market-priced service under
certain stipulations.
1 Monetary conditions
and changes in the interest rate
and the exchange rate
Economic growth in Hungary continued to slow during 2000Q3, with GDP growing by 4.6%. In contrast to previous quar-
ters, the driving force behind growth was domestic absorption,
while the contribution of net exports moderated. The external
balance position remained better than last year, but there was a
reversal in the improving trend in the current account. The
third-quarter continued to be affected by adverse inflationary de-
velopments, and even core inflation indicators reflect an inter-
ruption in the disinflation process.
As in the second quarter, the development of the real ex-
change rate continued to call for tight monetary conditions in the
third quarter, while the real rates of interest continued to decline
(see Chart II-1). Real appreciation of the exchange rate slightly
slowed in October.
The falling trend of real interest rates was interrupted when
the National Bank of Hungary raised interest rates as of October
11th. For the first time in two years, the central bank implemented
a significant – 100-basis-point – rise in the rates on the two-week
deposit facility, the overnight active repo and deposit. This un-
commonly high increase was prompted by the unfavourable
trend in inflation, and, more directly, by the publication on that
day of the September rate of inflation. The higher-than-expected
price inflation continued to be due primarily to factors falling
outside the scope of monetary policy. At the same time, in such a
situation, it is a priority of the central bank to do its utmost to pre-
vent the incorporation of inflationary shocks into expectations,
as an excessive rise in inflation expectations may reinforce the in-
ertial component of inflation, protracting the process of disinfla-
tion and generating additional costs.
As the use of different calculation methods can lead to major
discrepancies in the level of the real rate of interest, we present a
description of the various approaches in Box II-1. Quar-
ter-on-quarter indicators used in the Inflation Reports to describe
monetary conditions have recently introduced significant down-
ward bias into real interest rates and an upward bias into the real
exchange rate. In respect of both indices this bias was due to the
characteristics of seasonal adjustment and annualisation pro-
cesses used in the course of calculating inflation. Despite the dif-
ference in the levels, each real interest rate indicator followed a
downward trend up to September, while October saw an equally
unanimous reversal.
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Chart II-1 Chart II-1 Monetary conditions: the real
exchange rate calculated with EMU inflation*
* The real exchange rate, calculated using the new methodology introduced in the
September Report, also takes account of the fact that inflation is also subject to
change in the euro area. For a description of the calculations, see related Box in the
September 2000 Report.
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Box II-1 Different methods for calculating the real rate of interest
One of the constituents of monetary conditions, regularly moni-
tored in the Bank’s Inflation Reports, is the real rate of interest.
As apart from the extremely illiquid capital-linked bonds, Hun-
garian financial markets have no bonds with yields fixed in real
terms, the “real rate of interest” is always a constructed measure.
It can be calculated via several methods which vary widely in
terms of both concept and outcome. The different techniques all
have their advantages and disadvantages. The real interest rate
measure which has been preferred by the National Bank so far
and used in its Inflation Reports was markedly lower during the
previous quarter than the alternative indices. This phenomenon
has raised the need for the publication of alternative real interest
rate measures as well, together with a detailed introduction.
There are essentially three methods for computing the real
interest rate:
1. Ex post real interest rate. The ex post real rate is the real
yield actually realized by bond investors. For example, a
12-month ex post real yield is calculated by deflating the 12-month nominal yield of a year ago with inflation measured
during the bond’s term to maturity, i.e. the past 12 months. The shortcoming of the measure thus constructed is that, as
the nominal rate of interest used is a historical one (that of 12 months ago in our example), it takes no account of the
most recent developments in monetary policy. Consequently, it does not appropriately express recent developments
in monetary conditions.
2. Ex ante real interest rate. This measure is calculated by deflating the current nominal rate of interest with inves-
tors’ inflation expectations for the relevant period. Of all possible real interest rate concepts, the ex ante real interest
rate is the most meaningful in terms of economic theory, being the real rate relevant to households’ consumption and
investment decisions. As it contains the current nominal rate and current expectations, it is in principle an ideal mirror
of monetary conditions. However, in practice, its serious drawback is that there is no reliable and sufficiently represen-
tative information available on households’ inflation expectations relating to different time horizons. Calculation of
the ex ante real rate published in this Report is based on the results of the monthly Reuters survey of 15–20 macroeco-
nomic analysts on their inflation expectations. Apart from the small size of the sample, this procedure has the draw-
back of being confined to surveying inflation expectations about fixed dates (end of the current and next year). Conse-
quently, the 12-month inflation expectations used here have been calculated via interpolating between the fixed
dates.
3. “Traditional” real interest rate. Due to the unreliability of data on inflation expectations and the low information
content of ex post real rates, the most widely used technique involves deflating the current (e.g. 12-month) nominal
rate with the latest realised (year-on-year) inflation. Despite the fact that this real rate is derived from the latest informa-
tion, it is not really meaningful in terms of economic theory. Moreover, if there is a persistent downward trend in infla-
tion, then the “traditional” real interest rate measure will be continuously below the ex ante real rate, which is relevant
from the point of view of economics. The more backward-looking the inflation used for the calculation is, the more
pronounced this bias is. Therefore, this technique is widespread in countries with a stable rate of inflation: in this case
the “traditional” measure will be closer to the theoretically meaningful ex ante real interest rate.
In view of the shortcomings of the above-listed real interest rate measures, in the National Bank’s previous Reports
we used annualised, seasonally adjusted three-month inflation for the calculation of real rates.
4. Short-term annualised real interest rate. This measure can be regarded as a special variant of the “traditional”
real rate. It uses inflation data from the recent past (the Bank’s index looks back on the preceding three months), and
the nominal interest rate applied is the current measure of the three-month benchmark rate. Thanks to the shortness of
the backward-looking period, when there is a downward trend in inflation, this indicator has a smaller downward bias
than the 12-month “traditional” real rate (i.e. it remains below the ex ante real rate by a smaller margin). However, as
three-month inflation exhibits considerable seasonality in contrast to the 12-month rate, the inflation rate of the past
three months is derived from the trend-cycle of the seasonally adjusted price level, and then this three-month trend in-
flation is annualised. However, this is exactly where the disadvantage of the method lies. Should there be a temporary
jump in the three-month trend obtained after the seasonal adjustment, this will be significantly magnified by the
annualisation. Thus, the estimated trend will be much higher than the “genuine” trend of inflation. This is what hap-
pened during the previous quarter, when the level of the seasonally adjusted three-month real interest rate calculated
by the Bank plunged into the negative range, well below the level of the alternative measures of the real rate, even
though it moved in the same direction as those.
As far as the monitoring of monetary conditions is concerned, there is no ideal measure of the real interest rate. Re-
cent developments are unanimously reflected in terms of all alternative real rates (see Chart II-2) as a decline in the pe-
riod between July and September, brought about by the inflationary shocks. This trend then reversed in October, after
the central bank raised its benchmark rate. The actual level of real rates is best reflected in the ex ante real rate. Al-
though this measure of the real interest rate was at a historical low during the July-to-October inflationary shocks, this
was still no cause for major concern as the index did not drop below 3.2% in any month. Following the central bank’s
interest rate hike, it rose considerably, to 3.8%, in November. Nevertheless, caution should be taken as the inflation ex-
pectations which form the basis for this index are non-representative. Due to the nature of seasonal adjustment and
annualisation applied in its construction, the three-month annualised real interest rate used in previous Reports this
time conveyed information only about the direction of the real interest rate change in the previous quarter as its level
was strongly downward-biased.
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Chart II-2 Real rates of interest calculated with
different techniques
Monetary policy can, in principle, tighten monetary condi-
tions and influence inflation expectations using the instruments
of either interest rate policy or exchange rate policy. However,
the prevailing exchange rate regime has not enabled an effective
policy response to the adverse inflationary developments. In the
absence of an agreement with the government on the timing of
the modification of the exchange rate regime, the National Bank
was only left the instruments of interest rate policy by which to
respond to the inflationary shock. Following the interest rate
hike, as of October 30th, there were also changes to the central
bank instruments, more specifically, the use of the two-week de-
posit facility.
The September inflation rate and the central bank’s interest
rate hike had strong reverberations in the government security
market, exerting similar upward pressure on short-term yields as
the rise in the interest rate. At the same time, the reaction was
somewhat milder at the longest, 10-year, end of the yield curve
(see Chart II-3). Despite the approximately 100-basis-point rise
in the interest rate premium, there was no considerable interest
sensitive capital inflow during the weeks following the rise in the
interest rate, due partly to international developments. The pe-
riod up to November in 2000 Q4 was marked by deterioration in
global investor sentiment about riskier instruments (such as
emerging-market securities). Foreign demand for forint invest-
ments and the forint’s interest rate premium (see Chart II-4) were
also reduced by a temporary rise in euro yields taking place in the
period from mid-October to early November.
While August witnessed robust demand for forint conversion,
global capital market developments during the period beginning
in September exerted downward pressure on the demand for
conversion. The exchange rate of the forint broke away from the
strong edge of the trading band and remained inside the band, at
about 30–40 basis points from the edge, throughout the period
except for a few days. Not even the rise in the interest rate pre-
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Box II-2 Changes in central bank instruments
Deposit tenders
Beginning with the November reserve maintenance period, the central bank altered the conditions for the use of the
two-week remunerated deposit facility, switching over from periodical availability to a system of volume bidding. Pre-
viously, the Bank had set no limits on the volume of approved bids at the announced – benchmark – rate. Within the
framework of volume tenders, the Bank will announce a specified amount to be placed as deposits with the authori-
ties, for which the Bank’s clients may submit competitive bids, indicating their interest rate offers, taking into view the
pre-set interest rate ceiling. Bids are invited on a weekly basis, and the actual amounts to be tendered are announced
five weeks prior to bidding.
The system of volume bidding for this benchmark instrument is consistent with European Central Bank procedures,
with the only difference being that it is an active instrument in the case of the ECB, and therefore the interest rate limit
refers to a minimum rate. Furthermore, volume bidding expands the mobility of the central bank’s interest rate policy,
granting it greater flexibility in setting the term to maturity of the stock of sterilization instruments.
Changes in the reserve requirement
The National Bank of Hungary is to introduce a new reserve requirement system to become effective on February
1, 2000, cutting the required reserve ratio from 11% to 7%. The change is expected to boost competitiveness within the
banking system and reduce the rate of income siphoned off. At the same time, as the central bank must avoid excessive
increases in the money supply, the excess liquidity created as a result of the cut in the reserve requirement is to be neu-
tralised by means of selling floating-rate government bonds.
mium in the aftermath of the central bank’s interest rate hike
made the exchange rate return to the strong edge (see Chart II-5).
The rise in central bank and market interest rates also fed
through to commercial bank rates in the course of October.
Transmission was fastest and most efficient in respect of corpo-
rate sector lending rates, whereas the pass-through by commer-
cial banks of market-rate rises to household deposit rates seems
to be smoothed over a longer period of time. Although house-
holds’ financial saving rate was significantly higher in the third
quarter than previously, this had only a moderate impact on
monetary aggregates, as this increase was primarily due to pen-
sion fund contributions, as well as life insurance and equity in-
vestments. The rate of real growth in the household component
of monetary aggregates followed a downward trend up until Au-
gust, followed by a slight upturn. In respect of the corporate sec-
tor, the previous rising trend in the real growth rate of the narrow
money measure M1 reversed during the third quarter, simulta-
neously with a continued decline in broad money M3. Due partly
to the weak investment activity, the second quarter saw the be-
ginning of a shift in corporate saving preferences from time de-
posits to government securities. The net position of the corporate
sector reflected some improvement during the quarter, as a result
of a flat volume of borrowing and an increase in financial assets.
The trend seen over the past twelve months that the share of cor-
porate sector foreign exchange borrowing from the Hungarian
banking system was rising at the expense of direct foreign bor-
rowing continued. In addition, the third quarter also witnessed a
slight reversal in the previously falling share of forint funds,
which was probably partly due to the fact that the forint’s interest
rate premium had stabilized at a low, 200–300-basis-point rate.
1.1 Monetary base and demand
for forint conversion
In contrast to 2000 Q2, the three months to October were charac-
terised by robust growth in the monetary base (see Table II-1,
Chart II-6). The 15.7% average quarterly growth was primarily
due to the rapid pace of growth in reserve assets, while cash out-
side the banking sector increased at an unchanged pace. The
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Table II-1 Monetary base
HUF billions
2000
Opening March June July August September October
I Monetary base (II+III) 1439 1,373.5 1,420.6 1,417.4 1,482.9 1,503.9 1,503.5
Non-bank notes and coin 846.2 762.9 809.6 819 836.8 846.4 846.8
Other notes and coin 109.7 73.4 79.5 76.4 78.7 81 79.4
Reserves 483.1 537.2 531.5 522.1 567.4 576.5 577.3
II Net forint assets (b+c+d-a) 101.1 –248.6 –159.2 –142.9 –241.0 –243.6 –222.7
a) Sterilisation instruments 619.3 884.2 805.7 825.9 899.8 881.5 788.6
of which: NBH bills 0 96.8 235.3 270.4 418.4 470.4 452.6
b) Banking sector loans 120.3 117.1 104.5 103.8 103.4 102.1 99.0
c) Net claims on government 517.9 443.3 454.9 507.1 481 466.2 406.8
Of which:Treasury Account (–) 193.4 267.5 250.1 198.0 216.4 213.1 272.5
Government securities (+) 401.2 393.4 378.8 378.8 371.1 371.1 371.2
Other (+) 310.1 317.4 326.2 326.2 326.3 308.2 308.2
d) Other 82.2 75.2 87.0 72.2 74.5 69.6 60.1
III Net foreign exchange assets 1,337.9 1,622.1 1,579.8 1,560.3 1,723.9 1,747.6 1,726.2
Net foreign 504.4 700.7 73,6.915 748.8 918.3 936.3 988.4
Assets 3,269.1 3,476.6 3,435.6 3,503.0 3,710.1 3,872.3 3,945.6
Liabilities 2,764.7 2,775.9 2,698.7 2,754.2 2,791.8 2,936.1 2,957.2
Net domestic 833.4 921.4 842.9 811.4 805.6 811.4 737.8
Assets 1,550.4 1,569.9 1,452.4 1,443.0 1,398.5 1,408.4 1,338.3
Liabilities 717.0 648.5 609.5 631.5 592.9 597.1 600.4
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Chart II-6 Monetary base and its components
previously sluggish growth rate of reserves jumped to 21% dur-
ing August – a result of the July amendment to the reserve re-
quirement rather than the rate of M3 growth. The effective re-
serve requirement increased during the period under review,
thanks to a rise in the funds forming the reserve base. This in turn
was due to the fact that the banks’ short-term foreign borrowing,
on which there has been a 50% reserve requirement since July,
continued to increase at a significantly stronger-than-expected
pace.
The rise in reserves appeared to slow down to 15.4% in Octo-
ber. In contrast to an upsurge in August, the stock of sterilization
instruments decreased by HUF 111 billion to HUF 788 billion by
end-October, in line with the capital flows seen in the period Au-
gust to October. The composition of sterilization instruments
during the period reflected a rise in the proportion of the
three-month NBH-bills at the expense of the two-week deposit
facility, which dropped below 50% during September and Octo-
ber, in accordance with the intentions of the central bank.
1.2 Demand for forint conversion
and its components
Following the low demand for forint conversion in 2000 Q2, the
third quarter saw an upsurge, amounting to HUF 212.7 billion
(see Table II-2). After subdued demand in July, the lion’s share of
conversion (HUF 159.4 billion) was concentrated in August,
which was followed by another slowdown in September. The
high level of conversion in August was accounted for by
non-interest-rate-sensitive items, as the HUF 45.8-billion surplus
on the current account of the balance of payments was coupled
with high inflows of foreign direct investment, in contrast to in-
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Table II-1 Components of demand for forint conversion
HUF billions
1999
Total
2000
Q1 Q2 July August September Q3
A Conversion 807.6 374.0 22.6 15.8 159.4 37.5 212.7
a) Intervention in inter-bank foreign exchange market 708.4 374.2 20.4 15.8 159.4 37.5 212.7
b) NBH purchases from general government 99.2 –0.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sources of conversion (I+ ...+ IX.) 807.6 374.0 22.6 15.8 159.4 37.5 212.7
I Current account balance corrected for net foreign interest payments (1+2) –398.5 –75.2 –107.3 –5.5 52.9 –70.3 –23.0
1 Current account balance –497.8 –96.9 –125.2 2.1 45.8 –81.2 –33.3
2. Net foreign interest payments by NBH* 99.3 21.7 17.9 –7.6 7.0 10.9 10.3
II Foreign direct investment 407.5 63.6 170.4 21.0 67.8 9.3 98.1
III Intervention due to commercial banks** –11.5 33.0 –15.6 –17.2 16.1 24.2 23.0
IV Effect of derivatives*** –58.2 75.1 –41.5 19.1 –20.2 –2.8 –3.9
V Intervention due to domestic foreign exchange deposits –1.6 –7.4 –10.8 –10.1 –20.0 18.7 –11.4
VI Net portfolio investments* (1+2) 303.6 154.0 –79.8 –22.0 12.0 –8.4 –18.4
1 Government securities 152.3 142.9 6.4 3.2 34.8 0.0 38.0
2 Equity* 151.3 11.1 –86.2 –25.2 –22.8 –8.4 –56.4
VII Corporate foreign exchange (1+2) = (a+b) 237.1 11.0 88.2 –1.7 –15.2 62.2 45.3
1 Domestic 154.3 77.0 120.8 19.6 50.6 13.2 83.3
2 Foreign 82.7 –66.0 –32.6 –21.3 –65.8 49.0 –38.1
a) Shorter than one year –73.6 –32.8 –10.2 0.6 –44.8 –9.1 –53.2
b) In excess of one year 310.7 43.7 98.4 –2.3 29.6 71.2 98.5
VIII Capital transfers 8.2 3.8 14.5 6.6 9.5 3.6 19.7
IX Others 321.0 116.1 4.4 25.7 56.7 1.0 83.3
B Interest rate-sensitive (III+IV+V+VI/1+VII) 318.1 254.5 26.8 –6.7 –4.6 102.3 91.0
C Speculative 9.0 218.2 –60.9 5.7 –14.2 12.4 3.9
* Corrected for the net foreign interest payments of the general government.
** Conversion effect of the change in commercial banks’ total open position, i.e. the portion of open positions not hedged by derivative transactions.
*** Conversion effect of the change in forward contracts. With these two items the negative sign indicates the closing of long forint positions built up earlier.
terest-sensitive items, which reflected an outflow. The equity
capital outflow which began during the second quarter and
which stood in contrast to the previous trend continued into the
third quarter, although at a slowing pace. The composition of
conversion in September was the opposite of that seen in August.
September witnessed strong interest-rate sensitive conversion,
which was attributable primarily to corporate loans and the con-
version effect of banking activity and domestic foreign exchange
deposits. In the meantime, demand for government securities ap-
peared to decline, due broadly to an adverse shift in global in-
vestment sentiment about emerging markets. This led to an out-
flow of portfolio capital in net terms, as the outflow of equity cap-
ital was no longer offset by an inflow of foreign investment into
government stocks.
Despite strong interest-sensitive demand for forints, the Sep-
tember level of conversion was not exceptional, due to the large
deficit on the current account of the balance of payments and the
low rate of foreign direct investment.
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Box II-3 Foreign exchange market activities of the banking system in the period
of September to November
During the period under review, commercial banks reduced their long foreign exchange positions at a steady rate,
which is reflected in the decline in their on-balance-sheet open position (see Chart II-7). The banks’ weak demand for
foreign currency funds entailed a simultaneous drop in their demand for forward-exchange contracts for hedging pur-
poses. Apart from a brief period during the quarter, the size of their total open position was negligible.
The rise in the on-balance-sheet open position seen in August proved to be temporary. There was no noteworthy
change in the total open position as its value of HUF 10–20 billion, typical of the period under review, had been already
built up at the end of the previous period. The only difference was that this stable net open position was the balance of
a visible decline in capital inflow and forward contracts: the on-balance-sheet position fell from HUF 100 billion at the
start of the period to HUF 60 billion at the end.
The behaviour of the banks was influenced by mounting financial uncertainty in international markets. Global mar-
ket funds became more expensive, and there was a weakening of supply. The decreasing on-balance-sheet position
(see Chart II-8) could be partly due to the fact that the new central bank regulation of open positions, effective as of
July, curbed the profitability of speculation aimed at taking advantage of the forint’s interest rate difference (see Box
II-2 in September Report). Finally, the publication of certain macroeconomic indicators also triggered uncertainty in in-
vestors for short periods of time.
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2 The yield curve, interest rate
and inflation expectations
The Bank’s September Report on Inflation tracked develop-ments on the Hungarian government securities market
through the end of August. The three months that have passed
since then have witnessed a significant rise in zero coupon yields
of all maturities. Compared with the situation in early September,
there has been an upward shift of 140–170 basis points in the
three-month to five-year section of the yield curve, while at the
same time a smaller, roughly 80-basis-point rise occurred at the
longest maturity of ten years (see Chart II-9). The rise in yields
was not distributed evenly over time: the gradual upward trend at
all maturities, starting in mid-August, continued until October
11th. On that day the September rate of inflation was published;
the 10.3% year-on-year index was far above expectations. The
central bank raised its benchmark rates by 100 basis points on the
same day. As a result, October 11th and the following two days
witnessed a 90–120-basis-point rise in the section of the yield
curve up to the five-year maturity and a 60-basis-point rise at the
10-year maturity. During the period from mid-October, the vola-
tility of yields on government securities increased significantly.
The factors to blame for the increased market uncertainty in-
cluded doubts about the extent of increases in gas prices and its
impact on inflation, as well as a few apparently contradictory
pieces of news, such as the higher-than-expected rate of inflation
in October on the one hand, and Moody’s upgrading of the Hun-
garian foreign exchange debt on the other. From mid-November
medium-to-long-term yields began to drop a bit, indicating a fall
in long-term inflation expectations.
In the following an outline of the factors contributing to the
rise in yields is presented. In contrast to the past, the announce-
ments of CPI inflation rates during this quarter had a decisive im-
pact on yield growth. Every month since July, the published in-
flation data have exceeded market analysts’ expectations, al-
though to varying degrees. The widest divergence between ex-
pectations and actual figures was seen in the July and September
CPI inflation rates, published on August 11th and October 11th, re-
spectively (see Chart II-12). The inflationary shock in July re-
versed the downward trend of forint yields, and its announce-
ment set off a slow rise in yields at all maturities (see Chart II-10).
The significantly higher-than-expected September rate of infla-
tion, published on October 11th, and the 100-basis-point rise in
the official interest rate on the same day, triggered a jump in
yields. The inflationary shocks caused market participants to
make subsequent upward adjustments in their inflation expecta-
tions. According to a Reuters poll of macro analysts, their average
expectations about the rate of inflation at the end of 2000 rose by
approximately 2.5 percentage points to 10.01% in the period of
August to November (see Chart II-11). Long-term expectations
about the end of 2001 were also up, although to a smaller, 1.17
percentage point, extent. The November survey put the rate of
inflation at the end of 2001 at 7.06%. These figures imply that the
bulk of the rise in yields can be explained by rising domestic in-
flation expectations.
It can be seen that immediately after the July inflationary
shock there were no major changes in medium-term inflation ex-
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Chart II-9 Zero-coupon yield curves
pectations, but the ensuing surprise shocks made market partici-
pants increasingly view the rise as persistent rather than tempo-
rary. This is reflected in the fact that while the inflation expecta-
tions for end-2000 were significantly up in the immediate after-
math of the July shock, the forecast for end-2001 remained virtu-
ally unchanged. An analysis of one-year implied forward rates
also reveals that while one-year yields expected over the period
starting in one or two years’ time began to edge up after the July
shock, one-year yields for terms beginning in 3 to 5 years’ time re-
mained flat and only started to rise after the September publica-
tion of another surprisingly high rate of inflation.
Although the underlying factor in yield changes seen over the
past quarter was the rise in inflation expectations there were a
couple of other factors which also contributed to movements in
the yield curve.
In addition to the rise in the expected rate of inflation, there
was also a parallel increase in uncertainty about the future rate of
inflation, which may have also contributed to the yield rise, ex-
erting upward pressure on the inflation risk premium required
by domestic investors.
Changes in yields on the euro, which is regarded as an anchor
currency, followed a contradictory course. While the short end of
the yield curve rose in conjunction with the two ECB interest rate
hikes (25 basis points each, to 4.5% on August 31st, and to 4.75%
on October 5th), 3-to-5-year euro yields went down. However,
this is only true of the September to November period as a whole.
The temporary rise (of 15–20 basis points) in euro yields (at the
one-to-three-year maturity) coincided sharply with the period
from mid-October to early November which saw a jump in forint
yields, triggered by September’s significant surprise inflation and
the central bank interest rate hike. This was probably caused by
the higher-than-expected 2.8% rate of euro-area inflation an-
nounced in mid-October. Therefore, the temporary rise in euro
yields during the period under review is likely to have contrib-
uted to the rise in forint yields on the one hand, and to have
slightly reduced the increase in the forint’s interest rate premium,
generated by the central bank’s interest rate rise on the other
hand.
In addition to foreign yields, non-Hungarian residents’ de-
mand for government securities is also influenced by the ex-
pected depreciation of the forint. The September to November
period seems to have witnessed no considerable change in this
respect. The late-August session of the Central Bank Council
made it clear to market participants that, in all likelihood, there
would be no cut in the rate of devaluation in 2000. In early Octo-
ber, Ministry of Finance officials indicated that the time was not
appropriate for implementing the central bank’s proposal to
broaden the exchange rate band. As, however, at that time the
market did not strongly expect band widening in 2000 or a subse-
quent appreciation, the depreciation expected over the short
term did probably not have a significant impact on forint yields.
In addition to the expected devaluation and foreign yields,
domestic yields are also influenced by foreign investors’ re-
quired risk premium on the forint. The required risk premium
partly depends on the current international perception of emerg-
ing markets, or more broadly, riskier investments, and partly on
the degree of country-specific risk. These components of the risk
premium moved in opposing directions during the period under
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review. At the global level, risk taking lost momentum over this
period. This was reflected in the sharp rise in spreads on emerg-
ing market foreign-exchange bonds after late August, together
with another 30% fall in the Nasdaq index of high-risk IT shares,
which was reminiscent of the March plunge, and a jump in riskier
developed-country corporate-bond spreads. The average
spread on Hungarian foreign-exchange government bonds, one
of the possible indicators of the perception of country-specific
risk, followed a modest upward trend after early September.
From mid-October, however, it has definitely, although slowly,
decreased.
On November 14th, Moody’s gave the Hungarian foreign ex-
change authority an A3 credit rating. The announcement came as
a surprise for the market, as due to several postponements dur-
ing the year, the upgrading was only expected to take place next
year.
The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments,
a regularly published macroeconomic indicator with possibly
the greatest influence over exchange rate risk, was better than
market expectations in terms of both the July and August prelimi-
nary deficit published in early September and October, respec-
tively (by contrast, the September deficit, announced at the be-
ginning of November, came as a negative surprise).
Thus, it is not clear whether the deteriorating global risk factor
or on the whole slightly improving country-specific risk factor
exerted greater influence on foreign investor sentiment. The in-
crease in foreign residents’ government security holdings came
to a halt in mid-September, followed by a reversal, which implies
that foreign residents’ movements were most affected by the ad-
verse global investor sentiment prevalent during this period (see
Chart II-13). The interest rate hike of October 11th did not di-
rectly trigger a significant amount of interest-rate-sensitive capi-
tal inflow. This was primarily because the risk premium required
on forint investments also increased as a result of the rise in the
level of interest rates and stronger global uncertainty. At the same
time, late October saw another pick-up in foreign residents’ gov-
ernment security holdings.
This reflected the fact that foreign investors began to regard
the considerable rise in forint yields seen in mid-October as sta-
ble, and the invariably adverse global perception no longer had
an offsetting impact.
In sum, the underlying factor for the significant increase in fo-
rint yields seen after mid-August was the rise in inflation expecta-
tions and the inflation risk premium, which was up as a result of
increased uncertainty about inflation prospects. The sharp rise in
forint yields began to induce inflows of capital from end-
October, which was dampened by the increase in short-term
euro yields and the worsening of global investor sentiment about
emerging market risk.
The October 11th announcement of the rate of inflation and
the subsequent interest rate hike evoked a strong response from
the government securities market. Intriguingly, the rise in me-
dium-term yields at maturities of up to five years did not fall short
of the rise in short-term yields, and there was a virtually parallel
upward shift in the relevant section of the yield curve, while the
rise in 10-year yields was slightly smaller. The implication is that
there was indeed deterioration not only in the short-term but also
the medium-to-long-term – in other words, the central bank’s in-
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Chart II-13 Government security holdings of foreign
residents as registered by KELER and the three-year
zero coupon rate
terest rate hike failed to significantly offset the adverse impact of
the inflationary shock on medium-to-long term inflation expec-
tations. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that the unfavour-
able September inflation figure and the interest rate rise were an-
nounced on the same day, thus it is difficult to determine the sep-
arate impacts of the two events on the yield curve. It cannot be
ruled out that had there been a larger rise in the central bank rate,
medium-to-long terms yields would have risen to a smaller ex-
tent.
3 Interest rate policy
of commercial banks
During the period of August to October, the slow downwardtrend in bank rates seen over the past few months came to a
halt. Undoubtedly, the interruption of the disinflation trend and
the central bank’s 100-basis-point interest rate rise on October
11th exerted the greatest influence over the developments seen in
this period.
Commercial banks responded to the interest rate hike and the
resulting upturn in market yields primarily by raising short-term
corporate lending rates, up by 90 basis points in October relative
to the previous month (see Chart II-14).
The reaction was milder in respect of household deposit rates,
which gained a mere 20 basis points during October. Further-
more, small and medium-size banks seem to have reacted more
sharply to the rise in central bank and market rates than large
banks. The fact that deposit rates increased by less than market
yields is well illustrated in the increase in spreads (see Chart
II-15).
Household borrowing has been expanding strongly of late,
even though annual growth in consumer borrowing, amounting
to 79% over the first six months on average, fell to roughly 55%
during September and October. Consumer credit for short terms
(0-3 months) and over-one-year terms continued to display the
fastest growth, with the latter accounting for 82% of total con-
sumer credit. The value of new monthly loan contracts exceeded
HUF 52 billion in October, which meant a HUF 8 billion rise in the
stock of lending on September. Despite the overall upward trend
in interest rates, October saw a slight decrease in consumer credit
rates, while the spread between household borrowing and de-
posit rates as well as the real interest rate on household credit al-
ready started to edge down in the second quarter (see Chart
II-16). The value of market-based (non-preferential) building
and property purchase loans started to rise as of March 2000, with
new credit extension in September and October reaching HUF
8.5 and 5.8 billion, respectively, in contrast to a monthly average
of HUF 1 billion seen previously. The monthly increase in the
stock of this type of lending amounted to HUF 1.5–3 billion over
the past six months. Following a 5-percentage-point drop in the
market rates on building and property purchase loans during the
period from March to July, the downward trend came to a halt
(see Chart II-17). As noted in the September Report, lending rates
fell primarily because competition from centrally subsidised
housing loans with preferential rates forced the banks to follow
suit with market-based lending rates.
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4 Monetary aggregates
Slowdown in the real growth of monetary aggregates continued
during 2000 Q3, with a slight turnup during September in respect
of real M3 and M4 (see Chart II-18).
The underlying factor of the further decrease in real M1
growth is the rising weight in both corporate and household
portfolios of medium-term time deposits and assets outside M3,
partly at the expense of sight deposits. While apart from the ef-
fects of the millennium date change, households’ demand for
real cash balances has grown at a relatively stable rate, the down-
ward trend in the real growth of households’ sight deposits could
not be offset by small businesses’ fast-increasing sight deposit
holdings. This led to a further decline in households’ demand for
liquid assets. There was a reversal in the upward trend of the cor-
porate component of real M1, due to the fact that companies
tended to maintain their assets accumulated probably as a result
of postponed investment projects in high-yielding deposit ac-
counts, such as time deposits included with M3 and government
securities. Nevertheless, real M1 has grown at a faster pace than
the broader monetary aggregates (see Chart II-19).
Real M3 grew at the weakest rate of all aggregate measures of
money supply. The household component of broad money grew
at a slightly higher rate than inflation during the quarter, due pri-
marily to a fall in the real value of time deposits, which out-
weighed significant real growth in households’ foreign currency
deposits. At the end of the quarter, the household component be-
gan to expand at a slightly faster pace, exerting upward pressure
on the real growth of the aggregate as a whole. During 2000 Q2
and Q3, the corporate component of real M3 grew at a steadily
falling rate, despite rapid real growth in non-financial busi-
nesses’ time deposits, which was offset by weaker growth in cor-
porate real M1 (see Chart II-20).
In addition to weaker M3 growth in real terms, there were two
developments that influenced the real expansion of M4, the
broadest monetary aggregate, which comprises M3 plus govern-
ment securities. First, in contrast to weaker growth in the real
value of households’ government security holdings relative to
previous quarters, entailing a further decline in the real growth of
M4’s household component, the corporate component remained
at a high level, thanks to firms’ stronger demand for government
securities. Developments in the money supply over the period
under review point to a rearrangement in both households’ and
firms’ assets towards medium-to-long-term deposit accounts.
Households appeared to give preference to assets that fall out-
side the category of M4 (including shares, life insurance reserves,
pension-fund savings), which exerted downward pressure on
the real growth of the household components of monetary ag-
gregates. By contrast, the weight of government securities, and
to a lesser extent, time deposits, began to increase within corpo-
rate sector assets, alongside a drop in the proportion of liquid as-
sets. Thus, companies’ real M3 and M4 growth was faster than the
rate at which the corporate component of M1 expanded.
The structure of household and corporate sector assets was
determined by the real growth in net financial wealth, the alter-
native cost of the various asset types as well as transactional
money demand. Net growth in households’ real wealth re-
mained unchanged, at a stable 6% rate during the quarter, ex-
36 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
II. Monetary policy
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
F A J A O D F A J A O D F A J A
0
2
4
6
8
10
12M1 M3 M4
Per cent
1998 1999 2000
Per cent
Chart II-18 Real growth rate of monetary aggregates
Three-month moving average, same month a year ago = 100
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
F A J A O D F A J A O D F A J A
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14Households' M1
Total M1
Corporate and others'M1
Per cent Per cent
1998 1999 2000
Chart II-19 Real growth rate of M1
Three-month moving average, same month a year ago = 100
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
F A J A O D F A J A O D F A J A
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Households' M3
Corporate and others' M3
Total M3
Per cent Per cent
1998 1999 2000
Chart II-20 Real growth rate of M3
Three-month moving average, same month a year ago = 100
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
F A J A O D F A J A O D F A J A
Per cent Per cent
1998 1999 2000
Chart II-21 Real growth rate of households’ net
financial wealth
Three-month moving average, same month a year ago = 100
ceeding the real growth in the household components of all the
aggregates. This was in evidence of the fact that households
boosted their real assets primarily through increasing asset types
outside M4 (see Chart II-21). Velocity of circulation indices, char-
acteristic of transactions demand, continued to fall during the
quarter, reflecting a rising trend in transactions demand, as in
previous quarters (see Chart II-22).
5 Demand for corporate credit
The financing requirement of the non-bank corporate sectordeclined slightly during 2000 Q3. While the volume of bor-
rowing remained virtually unchanged, the stock of financial as-
sets increased. In the light of significantly lower-than-expected
investment spending during the period, it comes as a surprise
that there was no considerable improvement in the net position.
Provided these low investment figures are correct, this implies
that there was a sharp fall in corporate sector profitability and
sales, together with a sudden upsurge in the level of inventories.
This can partly be explained by slower-than-expected expansion
in domestic demand and weaker export demand.
Although the volume of borrowing remained virtually un-
changed in 2000 Q3, the last year has been characterised by fi-
nancial restructuring. Domestic financing began to play an in-
creasingly important role at the expense of external financing.
This can be traced back to two underlying trends. First, there was
a change in the forint-foreign currency composition of newly ob-
tained funds. Second, there was an upsurge in the proportion of
domestic foreign-exchange loans within FX liabilities (see Charts
II-24 and II-25). The denomination structure of financing under-
went a slight shift towards forint-denominated liabilities, due
probably to the fact that the forint’s risk premium stabilized in the
range of 200 to 300 basis points, down considerably on the 500
basis points a year earlier. This also fed through to corporate bor-
rowing rates, making forint-denominated loans relatively
cheaper than foreign-currency financing.
Foreign-currency financing underwent a more marked
change in the form of substituting domestic borrowing for for-
eign loans. As the relative weight of domestic foreign-currency
borrowing within corporate financing was previously consider-
ably smaller than that of foreign borrowing, the substitution
caused domestic foreign-currency borrowing flows and the
stock of lending to rise at an extremely strong rate, relative to low
base-period figures. An underlying factor in the pick-up in do-
mestic foreign-currency borrowing is likely to be this year’s regu-
lation restricting the commercial banks’ on-balance-sheet open
positions, which prompted the banks to boost credit extension in
foreign currency terms. Adjustment to the new regulation is
likely to have caused a one-off shift in the financing structure.
Non-financial corporations’ financial assets increased during the
third quarter, due to robust growth in forint-denominated instru-
ments. As forint assets grew at a faster pace than forint liabilities,
there was an improvement in the corporate sector’s forint posi-
tion (see Chart II-23). Within forint-denominated assets, there
was a substantial rise in companies’ time deposits and govern-
ment security holdings, which may indicate further postpone-
ments in investment.
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According to preliminary data, the Hungarian economy grewby 4.6% in 2000 Q3, relative to the same period a year earlier.
The driving force behind GDP growth in the third quarter contin-
ued to be export growth, but domestic absorption also played an
increasing role. The faster rise in domestic demand went hand in
hand with vigorous growth in import demand.
The gap between national accounts-based annual export and
import growth rates nearly closed, although there was no decline
in export growth (with exports and imports up by 20.6% and
20.2% respectively, on a year earlier). At the same time, the terms
of trade continued to deteriorate (by over 3 percentage points).
As a consequence, national accounts-based net exports played a
neutral role in economic growth, while domestic absorption be-
gan to contribute strongly (at 4.6 percentage points, see Chart
III-1).
Of the components of domestic absorption, consumer spend-
ing played a neutral role in the expansion of GDP in the third
quarter. The volume of household consumption was up 3.6 % on
a year earlier (see Table III-1), together with a 2.3% rise in opera-
tional incomes.
Whole-economy fixed capital formation rose by 2.2% in the
third quarter in a year-on-year comparison – a decline compared
with the 6% growth rate recorded for the first half. Fixed capital
formation contributed to economic growth at a significantly
lower rate (0.6 percentage points) in a quarter-on-quarter com-
parison (see Table III-2). There are indications that the expecta-
tions of strengthening investment activity have remained unful-
filled, despite the pick-up in external sales opportunities, ex-
panding domestic demand and the favourable financial position
of businesses.
Third-quarter growth in the volume of manufacturing invest-
ment (accounting for about one-fourth of all investment projects)
amounted merely to 1.4%, while average capacity utilisation was
relatively high in the sector, together with a steady rise in the pro-
portion of firms reporting capacity shortages relative to expected
orders.
As far as material-type services are concerned, overall invest-
ment volumes remained flat, while non-material services (such
as administration, education, etc.) experienced faster growth,
thanks broadly to a pick-up in the investment activity of local au-
thorities.
Stockbuilding, the other major capital formation item, along
with other unspecified components of absorption, continued to
make a substantial contribution to third-quarter GDP growth.
The level of industrial output stocks, which account for some
one-fourth of total inventories, expanded at a significantly faster
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Table III-1 Annual growth rate of GDP and its components*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total Q1 Q2 Q3
Q1–
Q3
total
Preliminary figures published
by Central Statistical Office
NBH estimates
Final consumption 4.3 4.3 4.1 3.6 4.1 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.1
Household consumption 4.5 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.5
Public consumption 3.2 0.0 1.4 –1.3 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.1
Gross capital formation** 8.0 3.9 –1.4 7.4 4.4 12.7 4.8 7.5 8.1
Fixed capital formation 5.7 6.1 3.6 7.5 5.9 7.0 5.5 2.2 4.4
Total domestic absorption 5.3 4.2 2.4 4.8 4.2 5.7 3.7 4.5 4.6
Exports 9.5 9.8 13.6 18.9 13.2 21.5 20.9 20.6 21.0
Imports 12.9 10.2 9.3 16.6 12.3 18.9 16.4 20.2 18.5
GDP 3.4 3.8 4.5 5.7 4.4 6.6 5.8 4.6 5.7
* The Bank’s quarterly GDP estimates are based on the quarterly GDP data published in
April 2000 by the Central Statistical Office on the period 1995–1999. The estimates are con-
sistent with the Bank analyses describing the income positions of individual income holders.
** Includes the statistical discrepancy, represented by the difference between the results of
calculations for production and absorption.
Table III-2 Contribution to GDP growth by individual items of absorption
Percentage changes on a year earlier
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total Q1 Q2 Q3 Total
Preliminary figures published
by Central Statistical Office
NBH estimates
Final consumption 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
Household consumption 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
Public consumption 0.3 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Gross capital formation* 2.2 1.2 -0.5 2.4 1.4 3.7 1.5 2.3 2.5
Fixed capital formation 0.8 1.3 0.9 2.6 1.4 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.9
Total domestic absorption 5.4 4.3 2.5 5.0 4.3 5.9 3.8 4.6 4.8
Exports 5.0 5.2 7.3 10.1 7.0 11.9 11.7 12.0 11.9
Imports 7.0 5.7 5.3 9.4 6.9 11.2 9.7 12.0 11.0
Net exports –2.0 –0.5 2.0 0.7 0.1 0.7 2.0 0.0 0.9
GDP 3.4 3.8 4.5 5.7 4.4 6.6 5.8 4.6 5.7
* Includes the statistical discrepancy represented by the difference between the results of
calculations for production and absorption.
pace than in the previous quarter.1 The volume of intermediate
goods sold on the domestic market was up by over 10% on a year
earlier, which was probably simultaneous with an increase in the
level of input stocks. The exceptional rise in intermediate goods
imports was one of the factors at work in the rising levels of input
stocks.
1 Household
consumption
Household consumption in 2000 Q3 continued to follow anupward trend, outstripping income growth, but in contrast
to previous quarters, this did not entail a drop in financial sav-
ings. Households’ overall income increased by 1.9% in real terms
in a year-on-year comparison. The key factor in overall income
growth was the 3.9% and 2.7% real growth in net earnings and
mixed incomes, respectively. The significant increase of benefits
in kind in real terms both in year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter
comparisons was partly due to one-off wage payments to health
care workers, causing a 3.6% rise in volume terms. The drop in
real cash benefits (1.9%) was due partly to the fact that pensions
rose at a rate lower than the rate of inflation (which is to be com-
pensated for in the fourth quarter), and partly to a decrease in
family support payments.
In 2000 Q3, total income growth (1.9%) fell short of opera-
tional income growth (2.3%) – i.e. adjusted for the portion of in-
terest income compensating for inflation (see Table III-3).
As households were smoothing their consumption, consump-
tion growth continued to outstrip operational income growth
(see Chart III-2). In the third quarter, consumption expanded by
3.6%, in contrast to a 2.3% rise in operational income. Hence,
consumption growth again exceeded operational income
growth, but the gap has narrowed compared with earlier peri-
ods, and in contrast to previous quarters, this discrepancy did not
result in a decline in financial savings.
While both consumption and operational income grew at a
faster pace than in 2000 Q2, operational income growth was one
percentage point up and consumption growth one percentage
point down on a year earlier. This was broadly due to individuals’
increased caution due to the resurgence of inflation and the fall in
the real value of pecuniary social benefits, the source of con-
sumption for low-income strata of households with a high mar-
ginal propensity to consume.
The rosy picture of the future created in people’s minds as a
result of the rise in employment and real incomes achieved by
several years of robust economic growth is likely to lead to a
continued expansion in consumption in excess of income
growth.
With consumption continuing to grow at a buoyant rate, a
third-quarter gross saving rate2 of 10.7% was recorded, which
was broadly unchanged relative to the same period a year ago
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Table III-3 Annual growth of household income and consumption in real
terms*
Percentage change on a year earlier
1999
2000
Q1 Q2 Q3
Total income 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.9
Operational income 2.8 0.9 1.4 2.3
Volume of consumption 4.6 3.3 3.5 3.6
* For an explanation of the correction of 1999 volume data, refer to the note to Table III-1.
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1 Based on industrial statistics.
2 All saving rates mentioned in this section are operational categories and sea-
sonally adjusted.
(11%), but up on the figure of 9.9% for the previous quarter (see
Chart III-3).
However, the composition of gross savings shows major
changes. The operational financial saving rate of 4.9% was signif-
icantly higher both in a year-on year and quarter-on-quarter
comparison (3.3% and 3.1%, respectively), while the 6.4% invest-
ment rate was 1.3 percentage points lower in a year-on-year
comparison.
In respect of housing construction, the largest item within in-
vestment, home building investment as a proportion of opera-
tional income stood at 5.2% in 2000 Q3, compared with 4.8% a
year earlier and 5.6% in the previous quarter. Although subsi-
dised loan facilities tended to boost home building investment,
the strong upswing expected has not yet occurred (see Chart
III-4).
The third quarter witnessed vigorous growth in financial sav-
ings. Households’ inflation-adjusted net financing capacity was
up by HUF 111.7 billion, as a result of the stock of financial assets
at HUF 155.1 billion and that of loans at HUF 43.4 billion. House-
holds’ financial assets were dominated by rises in pension fund
contributions (HUF 30.3 billion) and stock market share hold-
ings3 (HUF 29.4 billion), due to new issues, as well as foreign cur-
rency deposits (HUF 12 billion). Savings accounts and deposit
accounts continued to be unpopular with households, but the
decline seen in the previous quarter (HUF 36.4 billion) was inter-
rupted, and there was even a modest rise of HUF 9 billion. Notes
and coin continued to be a substantial item (HUF 35.9 billion).
Households remained inactive in the government securities and
corporate bond markets (see Chart III-5).
The largest item of households’ liabilities, consumer credit,
which has appeared to be relatively stable for some time, in-
creased by HUF 22.1 billion during the third quarter, compared
with increases of HUF 24 billion a year earlier and HUF 23.6 bil-
lion in 2000 Q2.
In addition, loans taken out to finance home building projects
and property purchases also expanded at a faster pace (up by
HUF 19.1 billion in contrast to the HUF 1 billion drop in a
year-on-year comparison, and the HUF 10.3 billion increase of
the previous quarter).
The high level of financial savings in the third quarter was
brought about by several factors. First, the saving rate was
boosted by the portion of large one-off payments left temporarily
unspent. Second, higher-than-expected inflation tended to in-
crease the element of caution in households’ behaviour. At the
same time, households are likely to target a lower saving level
against the backdrop of favourable income prospects, which
may lead to the stabilization of households’ financing capacity at
a low level.
Nevertheless, it is also possible that the financing capacity will
decline at a slower-than-expected pace. All in all, economic pol-
icy makers should monitor these developments and formulate
their responses accordingly.
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2 Investment
In 2000 Q3, whole-economy investment expanded by 2.2%year on year in real terms – a considerable slowdown com-
pared with the similarly weak investment activity seen during the
first six months (7% in 2000 Q1 and 5.5% in 2000 Q2). Although
one-fourth of total investment projects are scheduled to take
place during the fourth quarter, which may considerably modify
the annual growth rate in volume terms, the projections of strong
investment activity issued at the start of the year are likely to re-
main unfulfilled.
Expectations of buoyant investment activity also remained
unmet during the first half of the year. At that time the
weaker-than-expected performance was attributed to the fact
that the stronger investment activity seen over the past few years
(most notably in 1998) had created such large-scale capacities
that would suffice to satisfy the needs of a dynamic rate of pro-
duction for some time to come. Another assumption was that if
the cyclical position remained as favourable in the latter half of
the year as during the first six months, then the available capaci-
ties would run down, and consequently, stronger investment ac-
tivity would be encouraged (which companies did indeed have
the necessary resources to finance).
In view of the third-quarter investment figures, the above as-
sumptions have remained unjustified, despite the benign exter-
nal cyclical position and the rise in orders, which could have fa-
cilitated stronger investment. Data on industrial output and do-
mestic sales of investment goods, new orders and the persis-
tently high (approximately 80%) rate of capacity utilisation all
supported the likelihood of a different outcome. On the other
hand, the second-quarter fall in investment goods imports was
an indication of contrary developments, i.e. a slowdown in in-
vestment growth (although not to such a large extent).
At the moment, only conjectures can be made about the rea-
sons for the poor performance. It may be that corporate deci-
sion-makers are already taking into account the projected slow-
down in external activity and thus are not inclined to embark on
major investment projects at the time being. Instead, they are
seeking to make the utmost use of their capacities.
A sectoral breakdown of investment (see Table III-4) suggests
that the weak third-quarter performance was largely due to a
1.4% rate of manufacturing investment growth, accounting for
about one-fourth of total investment. Therefore, in the category
of material production, only the construction and electricity sec-
tors increased at a rate above average in volume terms (at 10.8%
and 6%, respectively). In other, traditionally weak, sectors (such
as agriculture, mining, etc.) investment even fell short of the level
for the previous year.
As far as material services are concerned, investment activity
remained basically unchanged in real terms during the third
quarter, falling considerably behind the approximately 10% vol-
ume growth seen in the previous quarter. Only the hotel sector
was able to achieve exceptional volume growth at 36%. The only
other sectors which were able to expand in real terms were the
property transactions and retail sectors (5.6% and 3.7%, respec-
tively). Investment in the transport and communication sector
did not expand in real terms, due partly to the sluggish start of the
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Table III-4 Whole-economy investment growth rates
Per cent
Distribu-
tion in
1999 (%)
1999
2000
H1 Q3
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing 3.3 96.7 83.5 92.1
Mining 0.4 149.6 78.4 88.6
Manufacturing 26.1 107.7 104.5 101.4
Electricity, gas, steam and water supply 6.9 103.8 92.1 106.1
Construction 1.9 112.1 106.2 110.8
Material production, total: 38.7 106.5 100.5 101.9
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of
motor vehicles, motorcycles, personal
and household goods 7.5 113.2 106.6 103.7
Hotels and restaurants 1.1 115.7 107.4 134.6
Transport, storage, postal services
and communications 17.9 101.9 116.2 94.5
Financial intermediation 2.8 90.5 95.5 97.5
Real estate, renting, business acitivities
and housing investment 19.2 111.6 110.4 105.6
Material services, total: 48.6 106.7 110.8 100.7
Material production + material services,
total: 87.2 106.6 105.8 101.2
Public administration and defence,
compulsory social security 4.3 127.0 120.7 111.0
Education 2.0 115.9 108.5 108.8
Health and social work 2.1 90.1 107.4 98.8
Other community, social and personal
services activities 4.3 95.7 99.6 111.8
Non-material services, total: 12.8 106.4 109.3 109.0
Total 100.0 106.6 106.1 102.2
motorway construction project, with similar performance seen in
the financial services sector.
Although investment related to property transactions ap-
peared to be rather volatile across the individual quarters, the
subdued rate of housing construction activity seems to be turn-
ing around. Although it is still difficult to monitor the number of
ongoing homebuilding projects, it is clear that the number of is-
sued building permits has been rising uninterruptedly since early
1999 (it increased by nearly 50% in 2000 Q3 in a year-on-year
comparison). Therefore, it can be assumed that a significant
number of houses and flats are being built, which is not yet re-
flected in the number of completed homes (which is broadly
identical to the figure for a year earlier).
Within non-material services, only health investment fell short
of the level seen last year in real terms, with the rest of the sectors
achieving a roughly 10% increase in volume terms, which is far
above average. Interestingly, while the key sectors of the econ-
omy experienced a general decline in investment, non-material
services can boast of strong rates of investment, even in terms of
combined data from the first three quarters.
In contrast to the previous quarters, the material and technical
composition of investment reflects largely identical rates of vol-
ume growth in machinery and construction investment projects
(2.6 and 2%, respectively). This reflects a marked decline in re-
spect of machinery investment, where the year-on-year volume
index has not fallen below 10% over the past two years, except
for the 8.5% rate seen in the previous quarter.
In terms of investment with respect to income holders, public
sector activity gathered pace as against the previous quarter (see
Chart III-6). This was primarily due to investment projects un-
dertaken by local authorities, with the central government mak-
ing no contribution to growth. The seasonally adjusted data on
private sector investment appear to have increased slightly, as a
combined result of a minor increase in corporate investment and
a higher growth rate in household investment.
3 The fiscal stance
The SNA-based primary balance improved by 1.0% of GDPrelative to 1999 Q3, thus the general government restricted
demand to this extent (see Table III-5). However, as noted in pre-
vious Inflation Reports, the developments during the year do not
allow any far-reaching conclusions to be drawn. Owing to the
annual nature of the budget and the limited extent of seasonality,
the financial developments relating to general government can
only be reliably analysed in view of all the developments that
have taken place throughout the entire year.
The sub-annual timing of a large portion of the receipts and
expenditure in the current period differed completely from that
seen in the base period. The gap between the primary balances
(in other words, the demand effect) appears to be narrowing
quarter by quarter, reflecting a more balanced trend in
sub-annual developments. The narrowing of the gap in the third
quarter was primarily due to the fact that by the third quarter of
1999 VAT revenues had returned to the normal level comparable
to that of this year.
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Table III-5 General government deficit as a percentage of GDP
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3
Preli-
minary
Q1 Q2 Q3
1 Central budget
balance excluding
privatisation –8.9 –2.6 –1.5 –2.9 –4.3 –1.1 –0.4
2 Primary balance
(excluding NBH) 1.0 3.0 4.1 3.6 3.0 4.2 4.2
3 Interest balance –9.6 –6.4 –6.0 –6.7 –7.4 –5.5 –4.8
4 NBH profits and losses –0.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
5 Balance of segregated
funds excl. privatisation –0.9 –0.1 0.0 –0.4 0.1 –0.1 0.2
6 Balance of Social
Security
funds excl. privatisation –2.2 –1.1 –1.2 –1.1 –0.8 –0.8 –0.7
7 Balance of local govern-
ments excl. privatisation 1.6 –1.0 0.6 0.0 1.3 –0.7 –0.1
8 Primary balance of local
governments 1.4 –1.2 0.4 –0.2 1.1 –0.9 –0.2
9 General government
balance excluding
privatisation –10.5 –4.8 –2.1 –4.4 –3.6 –2.7 –1.0
10 Out of this: primary
balance –0.7 0.6 3.4 2.0 3.5 2.4 3.5
11 Accrual-based deficit
of general government –9.5 –5.3 –3.5 –4.6 –3.5 –3.6 –2.0
12 Accrual-based primary
balance –1.5 0.7 2.7 1.8 2.4 2.0 3.1
13 Deficit correction for
financial transactions 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2
14 Deficit of Privatisation
and State Holding
Company –0.3 –0.5 –0.8 –0.8 –0.9 0.0 –0.3
15 SNA financing requ-
irement
(15=11+13+14 ) –9.5 –5.9 –4.4 –5.5 –4.5 –3.9 –2.4
16 SNA primary balance
(16=12+13+14) –1.5 0.1 1.8 –0.9 1.3 1.7 2.7
17 Effect of the pension
reform 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
18 Demand effect
(changes
in lines 16 and 17) 1.5 –0.5 –0.9 –0.6 –2.9 –1.7 –1.0
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Table III-6 VAT in real terms
Percentage changes on a year earlier
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Domestic VAT revenues 0.7 1.8 2.9 10.1 18.7 7.5 5.0
Import VAT refund** 8.9 3.2 –0.7 2.4 12.4 5.0 6.9
Net VAT revenues –9.0 0.7 6.2 17.6 27.7 9.6 3.2
* Adjusted by customs surety.
**Based on estimated accrual-based settlement.
As noted earlier, the first half of 1999 witnessed a one-off dip
in VAT receipts (see Table III-6). Then, during 1999 Q3, VAT re-
ceipts in real terms came broadly in line with the volume of con-
sumption seen both in 1999 and in 2000. However, due to the vol-
atility of VAT refunds, net quarterly VAT revenues grew at a
slower pace than last year. VAT refunds are being accounted for
in terms of the accruals-based approach as a means of removing
distortions. This year the estimation of the accruals concept is be-
ing hindered by the many changes affecting the VAT refund sys-
tem, with special regard to sub-annual timing.
Cash benefits to households in real terms continued to be sub-
dued as a result of the slower-than-expected disinflation. In re-
spect of pension payments, which account for nearly 70% of total
transfers, there will be retroactive supplementary payments in
the fourth quarter. This measure based on the provisions of the
Pension Act is expected to make the inflation-induced loss in the
real value of pensions only a temporary effect. The fact that in
1999 pensions were fully adjusted at the beginning of the
year accounts for the different seasonality, relative to the base
period (see Table III-7).
The rise in the proportion of investment projects within ex-
penditure is a welcome development. Local government invest-
ment spending in real terms began to increase during the third
quarter. As far as central government expenditure is concerned,
as before, most of the increase was focussed on institutional in-
vestment spending. The third quarter also witnessed significant
increases in priority projects in real terms, but this was not suffi-
cient to offset the decline seen during the first half of the year.
4 External demand
External business conditions continued to be buoyant in 2000Q3. There are some signs, however, that the acceleration of
external demand peaked out in the third quarter: (1) the con-
sumer confidence index in the euro area, although still high, fell
in the third quarter in a quarter-on-quarter comparison; and (2)
the business confidence index remained broadly unchanged rel-
ative to the previous quarter. Available data show that euro-area
GDP expanded by 3.7% in 2000 Q2, relative to the same period a
year earlier, due to a 0.9% quarter-on-quarter growth (see Tables
III-8 and III-9).
We use the method described in the June Report to calculate
external demand for Hungarian exports in terms of the import
and GDP rates of our main trading partners weighted with the
Hungarian export structure. In 2000 Q2, the year-on-year rise in
this weighted GDP and effective imports stood at 3.7% and 9.4%,
respectively. Although no factual data are available for 2000 Q3
and Q4, existing information indicates that external business ac-
tivity reached its peak this year, as is also reflected by the OECD
“coincidence” indicators, derived from the business cycle indices
of Hungary’s main trading partners (see Chart III-7).
In the second quarter, the CEFTA countries also enjoyed better
business conditions, although it is important to note that activity
in these countries also tapered off slightly. Poland registered
growth of 5.2%, down from 6% in the first quarter. The economy
in the Czech Republic seems to have regained its footing after the
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Table III-7 Selected public expenditures in real terms
Percentage changes on a year earlier
1998 1999 2000
H1 Q1–Q3 Year H1 Q1–Q3
Preli-
minary
H1 Q1–Q3
Pensions (including
disability benefits) 5.4 8.4 9.2 6.9 4.3 4.1 –0.9 –1.5
Sick-pay –4.4 –2.0 0.1 1.7 1.4 2.4 15.6 12.6
Social benefits
(central budget) –1.4 –2.3 –2.8 –1.1 –2.6 0.0 –0.8 –1.7
Social benefits (local
authorities) 28.9 30.2 26.1 –0.4 –3.3 –6.0 –10.7 –8.8
Household transfers,
total 4.8 6.7 7.0 4.5 2.2 2.5 –1.1 –1.6
Investment (central
budget) 12.6 0.7 –11.2 –12.4 –3.8 4.6 12.5 15.5
Investment (local
authorities) 70.9 9.7 10.7 –19.6 –15.2 –11.2 –3.6 3.1
Gross investment
expenditure 40.2 5.7 –0.3 –16.5 –10.4 –4.4 3.6 8.7
* Source: Public sector statistics, therefore this differs from CSO figures.
** Using the price indices for public consumption and investment.
Table III-8 Main macroeconomic indicators in the euro area I
Percentage change on a year earlier, seasonally adjusted data
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Real GDP 1.8 2.1 2.5 3.2 3.4 3.7
Domestic absorption 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.1
Private consumption 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 3.0
Public consumption 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.4
Gross fixed capital formation 4.0 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.7 4.8
Stockbuilding* 0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.3 0.0
Exports 0.6 2.2 5.7 9.7 12.3 12.8
Imports 3.5 4.8 7.0 9.0 10.5 11.3
Net exports* –0.9 –0.8 –0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7
New car registration** 6.7 8.5 6.6 –0.1 1.4 0.7 –7.7
Retail sale** 2.6 2.2 2.3 3.0 2.5 3.3
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, August 2000.
*Contribution to real GDP in terms of percentage points.
**Seasonally unadjusted data.
Table III-9 Main macroeconomic indicators in the euro area II
Percentage change on a year earlier; annualised, seasonally adjusted data
1999 2000
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Real GDP 2.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Domestic absorption 2.0 2.0 3.6 2.8 3.6
Private consumption 1.2 2.8 2.4 3.2 3.6
Public consumption 1.2 1.2 1.6 2.4 0.0
Gross fixed capital formation 5.7 7.8 1.2 7.8 2.0
Stockbuilding* –0.4 –1.2 1.6 –1.2 1.2
Exports 11.2 15.6 11.7 10.8 13.0
Imports 10.8 10.8 12.1 8.2 13.9
Net exports* 0.4 1.6 0.0 0.8 0.0
* Contribution to real GDP in terms of percentage points.
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2000
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recession, reflected in a recovery of 1.9% in the second quarter.
Economic growth in Slovakia rose from 1.5% in the first quarter
to 1.9%. Thanks to high world prices for energy and commodi-
ties, the economies of CIS countries continued to grow at a robust
rate (with a 6.7% increase in Russian GDP during the second
quarter).
According to estimates derived from preliminary data, in 2000
Q3, total exports of goods and services rose by 20.6% year on
year, with goods and services imports lagging somewhat behind
at 20.2%.
The contribution of the GDP balance of trade to growth re-
mained positive, although small. As described below, volume
and value data continued to diverge in the third quarter, due
broadly to changes in the terms of trade.
In 2000 Q3, customs statistics-based exports and imports
amounted to EUR 7,635 million and EUR 8,778 million, respec-
tively. There was a deficit of EUR 1,143 million on the balance of
trade, up by EUR 442 million on a year earlier (see Chart III-8).4
The pick-up in foreign demand was one of the factors boosting
export growth in 2000 Q3, with export trend growth rising at an
annualised rate of 30% in a quarter-on-quarter comparison. This,
however, took place together with rapid growth in trend import
values (see Chart III-9).
Seasonally unadjusted import data were characterised by
much faster growth than the trends, which was due, we believe,
partly to idiosyncratic effects (a few firms’ investment goods im-
ports rose temporarily above the customary rate during August5).
However, the substantial growth in exports was not capable of
putting a halt to deficit growth, and the balance of trade deficit
based on seasonally adjusted customs statistics continued to
worsen during the third quarter. This seems to justify the cautious
interpretation presented in the September Inflation Report,
which attributed the decrease in the seasonally adjusted value of
the deficit to a temporary effect. While in value terms, import
growth appeared to be more robust than export growth, the vol-
ume data does not reflect this difference, and the two variables
appeared to rise at virtually the same rate in a quarter-on-quarter
comparison (see Chart III-10). As the terms of trade continued to
worsen during the third quarter (by 3.1% relative to a year ear-
lier), the difference between the growth rates of export and im-
port volumes was smaller than that reflected by the value data.
The deterioration in the terms of trade can be primarily attributed
to rises in world prices for energy and commodities, while food-
stuffs and manufactured goods enjoyed slightly better terms of
trade. The terms of trade relating to machinery remained virtually
unchanged.
The improvement in volume indices compared with the value
data is also reflected in the balance of trade. While the seasonally
adjusted euro balance continued to show a large deficit similarly
to previous quarters, the third-quarter balance at constant prices
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4 Only preliminary data are available for the third quarter as the processing of
submitted customs declaration forms is a continuous source of new informa-
tion. As the figures in this Report contain the expected adjustments, the final
data may modify the current picture.
5 In the course of seasonally adjusting the import series, this EUR 200 million
amount was regarded as an abnormal observation by our expert estimates.
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deteriorated only slightly, following some improvement in the
second quarter (see Chart III-11).
The country structure of exports also reflected the changes in
external demand. Exports to developed countries continued to
expand at an unbroken pace in the third quarter (see Chart
III-12).
The growth in exports to CEFTA countries, which started in
1999 Q1, gained further momentum (see Chart III-13). This area
experienced the most robust growth in demand for Hungarian
exports, with the annual rate (37%) exceeding the rates of ex-
ports to both the developed countries (31%) and EU-countries
(29%). There was no pick-up in export growth in relation to the
CIS countries in the third quarter (see Chart III-14). The high an-
nual growth rates seen previously can be attributed to low
base-period values as the Hungarian exports to this area remain
clearly flat.6
An analysis of the composition of exports (see Chart III-15) re-
veals that durables exports continued to top the list (up by 52.6%
on a year earlier).7 Short-term indices indicate a recovery in in-
vestment goods exports. The June Inflation Report noted that the
quarterly trend of investment goods exports had declined, seem-
ingly in contrast to developments in external demand. However,
third-quarter data reflect a turnaround in export rates following
the low rates of the first and second quarters. In a year-on-year
comparison investment goods exports continued to rise signifi-
cantly (20.5%).
This implies that the second-quarter developments were due
to special factors and probably did not signal the start of a
long-term decline. Relative to the previous quarter, the trend in
non-durable consumer goods exports slowed to such a great ex-
tent that this even fed through to the annual growth rate. The
quarter-on-quarter slowdown in the trend of intermediate goods
exports excluding energy continued in the third quarter. How-
ever, owing to low base-period rates, year-on-year growth re-
mained substantial (at 39.9%).
The SITC breakdown of exports (see Chart III-17) shows that,
in contrast to the previous quarter, food, beverages and tobacco
export growth fell short during the third quarter, a development
also reflected in the annual growth rate (6.4%). Machinery ex-
ports excelled in terms of annualised trend growth (44.7%) and
annual growth (37.4%), thanks to acceleration in the export
growth of both investment goods and consumer durables. Manu-
factured goods were exported at a steadily growing rate (up by
22% on a year earlier). Commodity export growth slowed down
to a negligible extent – to 13.8% – in a quarter-on-quarter com-
parison.
An analysis of the breakdown of imports (see Chart III-18)
shows that consumer durables imports continued at the rate seen
in the second quarter. The quarter-on-quarter annualised decline
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6 The 31% annual growth rate calculated in dollars switched into a decline of
7.4%. This abrupt change is due to the “exit” of the low 1999 Q2 from the base.
Exports to the CIS countries calculated in euros rose by 6.4%. The nearly 14%
difference between dollar and euro data was predominantly due to cross ex-
change rate changes.
7 In the absence of sufficient data, the analysis of export composition refers to
series which do not include the latest corrections.
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in this category amounted to 7%.8 This was not reflected in the
annual index, which continued to show a 10.1% rate of growth.
This may be associated with the fact that consumption of con-
sumer durables, with special regard to imports, seems to have
slowed. Investment goods imports grew basically at the same
rate (7.3%) as the previous quarter (in a year-on-year compari-
son, investment goods were also imported at a lower rate, with
8.8% growth in the third quarter). The slowdown in growth may
be associated with the decline in machinery investment seen dur-
ing the third quarter.
One possible implication is that machinery investment is not
likely to pick up during the fourth quarter. Although there are no
volume data available for this breakdown, the deflator required
for the calculation of such data can be approximated with foreign
producer prices in forint terms and the imported machinery price
index. The estimated year-on-year import volume of investment
goods expanded minimally (by 1.2% and 2.8% in terms of the dif-
ferent indices), due to the rise in import prices and external pro-
ducer prices. Chart III-19 shows that the estimated volume of in-
vestment goods imports slowed more strongly than the value in-
dices calculated in euro. By contrast, intermediate goods imports
did not slow, with growth still exceeding 38%. This is due, in all
likelihood, to robust industrial production and the associated
strong demand for imports, arising primarily from the robust ex-
port growth rate. Non-durable consumer goods imports stabi-
lized at a rate outstripping that of consumer durables (up by
24.6% on a year earlier). The over 100% year-on-year rise in en-
ergy imports was dramatic as a result of the price rises for energy.
In examining Chart III-20 for the contribution of the various
product categories to import growth, one can see that energy and
intermediate goods have come to top the list. This is associated
with the energy price rises and the relatively high aggregate out-
put, stronger domestic sales and steady export growth. At the
same time the role of the other three categories, particularly that
of investment goods, declined markedly.
As in the previous two quarters, the favourable performance
of the services category contributed significantly to the improve-
ment of the external balance in the third quarter. The services
balance on the balance of payments amounted to EUR 749 mil-
lion, with the surplus up EUR 158 million on 1999 Q3. The
seasonally adjusted figure was slightly better than in the previ-
ous quarter, predominantly due to the increase in the travel sur-
plus.
The travel balance in 2000 Q3 recorded a surplus of EUR 907
million as a result of receipts of EUR 1,221 million and expendi-
tures of EUR 314 million, an increase of EUR 147 million on a year
earlier (see Charts III-21 and III-22). The seasonally adjusted in-
crease in the travel balance, slightly surpassed the sec-
ond-quarter performance, gathering further momentum during
2000 Q3. In a year-on-year comparison, the euro value index
rose by nearly 26%, while in terms of annualised quar-
ter-on-quarter indices it went up by 11%.
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8 In the absence of sufficient data, the analysis of import composition refers to
series which do not include the latest corrections
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According to our estimates, the volume growth of receipts was
slower than growth in value data, up 6.6% in a year-on-year com-
parison. Travel statistics also reflect a pick-up in tourism. Al-
though in contrast to a 20% growth rate in 2000 Q2, the number of
tourist arrivals rose by merely 1% during the third quarter, the
growth rate over the first nine months amounted to 6%, following
years of decline. This year the number of tourist arrivals from the
European Union rose for the first time (by 2.7%), while there was
an upsurge of over 20% in the number of visitors from countries
of Eastern Europe and outside Europe. The number of tourist
nights spent in public accommodation units rose by 4%, relative
to a year earlier.
Despite the 2 % drop in the third quarter, the number of Hun-
garians travelling abroad rose by 2.5% during the course of the
first nine months. In the analysis of both inward and outward
tourism, the base-period effect should be taken account of. In
1999 Q2, travel rates plunged due to the Yugoslav war, while the
third quarter, following the end of the war, saw an upsurge.
The services balance excluding travel continued to improve in
the third quarter, although at a slower pace than previously (see
Chart III-23). EUR 774 million on the credit side and EUR 935 mil-
lion on the debit side resulted in a deficit of EUR 157 million, a
slight improvement on 1999 Q3. As in the previous quarters, the
improvement was brought about by growing receipts in addition
to flat expenditure levels in terms of seasonally adjusted data.
The euro-based, quarter-on-quarter annualised value index rose
by 40% in respect of receipts and over 20% in respect of expendi-
ture (see Chart III-24).
A close look at the performance of the different services re-
veals signs of long-term improvement in the area of construction
and installation, thanks to a cutback on costs together with a
weaker rate of investment. All in all, the services balance contin-
ued to improve during the third quarter, going hand in hand with
stronger external demand and a pick-up in goods exports.
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1 Labour market
Two noteworthy developments occurred in the third quarterof 2000. First, real indicators pointed to the continuation of
the previous trend. The 1.3% increase in private sector employ-
ment pushed the participation rate over 50%, and the simulta-
neous rise in the number of hours worked reflects steady,
broad-based growth in the use of labour. At the same time, the
rate of unemployment falling to 6% and the lowest layoff rate of
recent years, together with a rise in the average number of hours
worked, especially in manufacturing, points to a tightening in the
labour market.
Second, although nominal indicators suggest that private sec-
tor wage inflation slowed compared with the previous quarter,
the third-quarter rate of 13.2% appears to be a sign of nominal ad-
justment to the higher-than-expected inflation path. Although
the 11.9% wage index of the public sector is above the
pre-announced rate, this can be largely attributed to wage rises fi-
nanced by fiscal institutions from their own funds, as well as
one-off extra payments to health-care workers.
1.1 Labour utilisation
Quantitative changes in labour – the production factor used to
produce market goods, such as industrial goods and services, as
well as public services – are reflected in changes in the number of
employed people, and, even more accurately, in total hours
worked (see Chart IV-1).
According to the household labour force survey (LFS) of the
Central Statistical Office (CSO), labour market activity continued
to be buoyant in 2000 Q3, even strengthening slightly. The num-
ber of employed people rose by nearly 1.1% in a year-on-year
comparison, reflecting a brisk 1.6% rate of annualised1 growth
relative to the previous quarter.
The fact that the rise in the number of employed people varied
by sectors reflected the continuation of earlier trends. The house-
hold survey implies that the annual rise in the overall number of
employed people occurred as a result of pronounced increases
in the private sector, with special regard to the market sector (ex-
cluding agriculture), and flat-to-falling levels in the public sector.
Within the private sector, market services made the strongest
DECEMBER 2000 • QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION 49
IV. Supply
3650
3700
3750
3800
3850
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Per cent
Rate of change (right-hand scale)
Employment (left-hand scale)
Thousands
1997 1998 1999 2000
Chart IV-1 Level of employment and the rate of
change*
* Source: CSO LFS. Based on seasonally adjusted series. Changes in the number of
employed people are always related to the previous quarter.
1 In order to facilitate comparability with year-on-year indices, month-
on-month indices are annualised by raising them by a power of 12, while quar-
ter-on-quarter indices are raised by a power of 4.
contribution to the average growth rate of 1.3%. In terms of the
seasonally adjusted sectoral series, market services, such as
wholesale and retail trade, repair, hotels and restaurants, were
the driving force behind the increase.
In respect of certain sectors, such as manufacturing and a
number of market services (communications, financial services,
etc.) the relevant source of information is the institutional labour
statistics of the CSO, based on a survey of businesses employing
over five people, as small businesses are not typically engaged in
such activities. These institutional statistics indicate that the num-
ber of people employed in manufacturing continued to increase.
Just as last year, the 2.6% year-on-year average rate of growth was
the result of an 11% rise in manufacturing, such as machinery and
the associated basic metal manufacturing, as well as a roughly 5%
rise in the number of manual workers (omission of this latter cat-
egory would lead to a decline in manufacturing employment).
The institutional statistics survey also reflects the strong increases
reported in the household survey of market services. The number
of people employed in wholesale and retail trade and repair, as
well as real estate and business activities,2 rose markedly: the an-
nual growth rate of 6–7% remained only slightly below the rate
for last year.
It has been noted that total hours worked provides a better es-
timate of the labour cost of economic growth than the number of
employed people. Long sectoral data series are only available on
the hours worked by the industrial blue-collar labour force. Sea-
sonally adjusted data show that total hours worked rose rapidly,
in parallel with the number of employed people – and frequently
at an even higher rate (see below). The increase in the hours
worked in the machinery industry was the primary driving force
behind the rise in total manufacturing hours worked;3 which
went from the 1996 low of 240 million to over 260 million in 2000;
the hours worked in machinery manufacturing rose by roughly
1.5 times from 60 million, simultaneously with a flat-to-falling
rate for the other sectors. (The past two years have also witnessed
a rise in the basic metal and the manufacturing sectors as well).
Recent quarters have also seen strong increases in the hours
worked in these sectors. As data on the hours worked within
other areas of the private sector have only been available since
1998, they can only be analysed via simple annual indices. Ac-
cording to the data, labour supplied for the private sector as a
whole rose by about 1% from the 849 million hours worked in
1999 Q3. This involved above-average annual growth in
blue-collar labour in the sectors of retail and wholesale trade and
repair, hotels and restaurants, as well as in white-collar labour in
real estate and business activities.
All in all, in accordance with previous tendencies, the amount
of labour used by the private sector expanded at a rapid rate. The
question is whether this trend will run up against limited supply –
in other words, whether the intensity of the utilisation of the la-
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2 In addition to real estate activities, this heterogeneous sector comprises a va-
riety of other services, such as those related to renting machinery and other
equipment, information technology, research and development, as well as
consulting and advertising activities.
3 These data are recalculated using a statistical method for businesses employ-
ing over 5 people for the full period.
bour force can increase further, and whether domestic labour re-
serves are sufficient to support economic growth. The existence
of labour market tightening may dampen economic activity, and,
typically in the case of market services, may trigger a rise in real
wages (real labour costs), exerting inflationary pressure.
1.2 Labour reserves and the risk
of labour market tightening
The labour reserves for the extensive expansion of the private
sector are to be sought within certain unemployed and inactive
groups, as well as, in respect of certain sectors, within the labour
force of the public sector. Due to the nature of economic growth
in Hungary, effective labour reserves primarily consist of highly
educated and skilled groups and/or people who have only been
out of work for a short period of time. However, by the late nine-
ties, economic growth seems to have absorbed the unemployed
and inactive groups that were easy to reactivate. This necessitates
an analysis of the possibility of labour market bottlenecks emerg-
ing. Such an analysis can be conducted partly by measuring the
level of available labour reserves and partly by studying the in-
tensity of labour utilisation.
The utilisation of the capacity provided by the total domestic
labour force can be described using several indicators. First and
foremost, the economic activity or participation rate is frequently
used as an indicator of potential labour supply, showing the por-
tion of the 15–74 age group that are part of the labour market, ei-
ther as employed or unemployed people. Employment growth
and the decline in inactivity have taken place simultaneously
with a decline in this age group, causing this indicator to rise to
53.5% during the third quarter, still far below the initial levels
seen in 1993 or those in more advanced economies. As noted
above this does not imply the existence of voluminous labour re-
serves, as not each and every inactive or even unemployed
group can be regarded as part of effective labour supply.
The employment rate is different inasmuch as, being a mea-
sure of the employed proportion of the 15–74 age group, it indi-
cates the sum of the unemployed and the inactive as the compo-
nents of the unutilised labour force. By the third quarter of 2000,
employment growth had pushed this rate above 50%, close to the
highest value (52.5%) measured since the statistics were intro-
duced in 1992.
Finally, the degree of labour capacity utilisation can be de-
scribed in terms of the unemployment rate, which regards the
unemployed only as the reserve force of labour. According to this
indicator, derived from the internationally (ILO) compatible LFS
of the CSO, the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.2%. The impli-
cation is that the utilisation of the potential labour capacity has
reached (100 – 6.2) = 93.8%. In a narrower interpretation, only
the unemployed group that constitutes effective labour supply
should be taken into account. However, no detailed data are
available on education and skill levels which would be required
to separate out effective labour supply. One sign of the existence
of regional labour market bottlenecks is that the rate of unem-
ployment in the western areas of Hungary, the centre of indus-
trial recovery, has fallen to 4–5%.
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In addition to the CSO data, the level of labour reserves can
also be measured using supplementary statistics published by
the National Labour Centre. Claimant count unemployment re-
corded in the administrative database has been falling steadily,
bringing the third-quarter rate of unemployment4 down to 9%,
compared with 10–11% in 1998. As noted earlier,5 a flow concept
may be a better guide to labour market developments than the
stock rates. The number of collective redundancies could serve
as an approximate indicator for the number of people entering
unemployment. Collective redundancies represent a part of ef-
fective labour reserves which, by definition, have only been out
of work for a short period of time and are therefore relatively
easy to reactivate. At the same time, the administrative nature of
the data restricts the scope of inferences that can be drawn. Nev-
ertheless, the tightness of the labour market is reflected in the fact
that, as a result of the steady decline seen since late 1999, the ratio
of collective redundancies to the number of employed people
has dropped to a “historical” low of one-tenth of the initial level
seen in 1993 (see Chart IV-2).
As noted above, public sector redundancies may add to avail-
able effective labour reserves in certain sectors of the economy.
The labour force shed off due to the contraction of the public sec-
tor labour market could be rechannelled into those private sector
services which rely on white-collar labour, requiring at least sec-
ondary school education, but no specialised skills. Our data
show a continuation in the decline in public sector employment,
primarily affecting the manual labour force (in contrast to
white-collar employment, which seems to be even expanding in
certain sectors). Thus, developments in the public sector are not
likely to ease labour market tightness in the private sector.
The shrinkage of labour reserves will primarily entail a more
intense utilisation of the employed labour force. Wage rises,
which pose the threat of cost-push inflation, are likely to ensue
only when the first response has run up against ‘natural’ or regu-
latory (labour laws) restrictions. The intensity of labour utilisa-
tion is measured by average hours worked by each employed
person. As noted above, long data series are only available in re-
spect of the manufacturing manual labour force, while data for
the private sector as a whole are only available for the post-1998
period. Based on the former source one can say that monthly
hours worked by manual workers in manufacturing have risen
substantially, by roughly 1 hour on average, since 1993. The cur-
rent average intensity of 37.4 hours per week appears to be high
in international comparison, with only the Czech Republic,
known for exceptionally high rate of manual labour hours
worked in manufacturing, showing higher figures than Hungary
(see Box IV-1).
Developments over the past few quarters have reflected a
generally rising trend in average hours worked in key manufac-
turing sectors since the Russian crisis. Hours worked in the tex-
tile, wood and paper industries have surged, which signals re-
structuring efforts and improvement in efficiency rather than a
tight labour market, considering this year’s large-scale layoff of
manual workers (the textile and clothing industry recorded espe-
cially low numbers of average hours worked compared with
other countries) (see Chart IV-3).
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4 This rate is the Bank’s own calculation, see page 46, 2000 June Report.
5 Page 42, 2000 September Report.
It has only been possible to record hours worked in market
services since 1998, in the form of simple annual indices. This sec-
tor tends to show a different picture than manufacturing. While
in 2000 Q3, the hours each person worked in manufacturing in-
creased relative to a year earlier, market services recorded
flat-to-falling numbers. Developments over the past two years
reflect no trend-like increase in labour force utilisation (indeed,
the monthly and quarterly fluctuations are due to movements in
the number of working days). On the other hand, it is a fact that
the hours worked in services, especially in trade and repair, were
significantly higher than in manufacturing, by 2–3 hours
monthly, on average. This implies that in the area of market sec-
tor services, entrepreneurs have only limited freedom in intensi-
fying the utilisation of the employed labour force in an attempt to
adapt to the relatively tight labour market, due to ‘natural’ and
regulatory restrictions on maximum working hours. Therefore,
an acceleration in wage inflation, carrying with it the threat of in-
flationary pressure, is a more imminent danger here than in man-
ufacturing.
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Box IV-1 Hours worked in Hungarian manufacturing
in an international comparison
Hours worked is often regarded as a key measure of labour market conditions, giving a better understanding of the
relationship between demand and supply and changes therein than the number of employed or unemployed peo-
ple. This is because entrepreneurs will tend to respond to information on cyclical expectations on the ‘intensive
margin’, i.e. by changing working hours, rather than on the ‘extensive margin’, i.e. by changing the number of em-
ployees. This is especially true of the highly regulated environment of European economies, where the costs of dis-
missal may be substantial (also incorporated into hiring costs by forward-looking entrepreneurs). Thus, a change in
hours worked is one of the key indicators of the cyclical position of many countries. The level of hours worked is an
interesting measure of capacity utilisation in its own right. However, it is difficult to determine total capacity utilisa-
tion, as neither the natural upper limit of 168 hours nor the ‘statutory’ 40 hours provides much of a clue.
In terms of economic theory, total capacity utilisation could be defined as the level of hours above which there
will be a rise in real (hourly) wages or above which wage inflation will begin to accelerate. Theoretically, this level is
affected by several factors. An increase in the capital intensity of production or statutory regulation may reduce the
hours worked by boosting real wages or imposing costs on overtime or shift-work patterns, respectively; (regula-
tion relating to dismissal costs will typically affect the intensity of the cyclical movements of the hours worked). Fur-
thermore, social and tax regulations providing for explicit maximum working hours or other type of working condi-
tions, and the market positions of companies will also influence the ‘equilibrium’ level of the number of hours.
In the absence of a model required for the application of our definition, an international comparison of the hours
worked may be a source of information. Hungarian manufacturing hours worked appear to be ‘in mid-field’ in a re-
gional comparison: less advanced countries, such as Russia, Slovakia and Croatia, are characterised by lower hours
worked. By contrast, countries with better economic performance, although somewhat less advanced in terms of
restructuring, such as the Czech Republic or Slovenia, have higher rates. In a European comparison, Hungarian fig-
ures (as well as Czech and Slovenian) appear to be high, while most advanced economies have lower (e.g. Austria
and Norway) or similar figures (e.g. Belgium, Portugal, Finland). In a sectoral breakdown, despite the strongly rising
trend, the number of hours worked in the machinery industry fall short of the figures for European countries, to-
gether with figures for the chemical industry and non-metal sectors (see Chart IV-4). At the same time, a global com-
parison reveals that a number of emerging countries which have achieved fast industrialisation (e.g. Mexico and Ko-
rea) work considerably higher hours than Hungary.
If the level of total capacity utilisation relating to the Hungarian labour force is identified with the highest number
of hours worked in the sector in question, it can be seen that the level of hours worked in Hungary is relatively high
as there are few European countries with higher levels. It should be considered, however, that Western European
countries incur much higher real wage costs than Hungary, due to high capital intensity and welfare regulation; thus
the Hungarian ‘equilibrium’ level of hours worked must be higher. The situation is just the other way round com-
pared with newly industrialized Mexico and Korea. Thus, in Hungarian manufacturing the hours worked represent-
ing total capacity utilisation (see Chart IV-5) should be seen as lying somewhere in the middle between the figures
for Western European countries and emerging economies outside Europe (probably slightly closer to the former).
1.3 Wage inflation
The acceleration in wage inflation seen in previous quarters did
not continue in 2000 Q3. Thus, the exceptional rates of wage in-
flation recorded in the second quarter may be regarded as tem-
porary. The 13.2% growth in third-quarter wage inflation in the
private sector reflects accommodation to slower-than-expected
disinflation. The average pace of wage inflation over the first
three quarters was similar to that seen last year, as was consumer
price inflation. National Bank analysts believe that the fact that
nominal wage indices show no decline is serving to stabilize con-
sumers’ real wages and is not a sign of the economy ‘overheating’
or the threat of cost-push inflation. The most pronounced devia-
tion from the general trend in wage inflation was seen in the trade
and repair sector. The nature of the difference is discussed be-
low. The public sector’s third-quarter wage index was lower than
in the private sector. Although at 11.9%, the rate exceeded the av-
erage centrally provided rate of 8.5%, this was primarily due to
two factors. On the one hand, public-sector institutions have also
been enabled in the past by their own funds to give slightly
higher wage rises than centrally announced. This is reflected in
the sector’s wage indices of around 9–10%. This was exceeded by
the July wage payments in health-care, accounting for one-fifth
of the public sector, which exceeded the usual rate by one third
on average. These wages were paid on a one-off basis and were
not incorporated into monthly wages. This extra payment, gen-
erating a 62.5% wage rise in July, raised the third-quarter aver-
age wage index of the public sector by 2.3 percentage points, in-
stead of 9.6% but for this extra payment. The third-quarter jump
in the public-sector wage index is thus only a temporary devel-
opment and implies no accommodation of wages to higher-
than-expected inflation within the public sector. There were two
noteworthy developments in respect of key areas of the private
sector. First, there was a substantial narrowing in the difference
between the rate of wage inflation in manufacturing and that in
other market sector services (such as hotels and restaurants;
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All in all, although high in an international comparison, Hungarian hours worked – which was steadily rising over
the late nineties – are probably still below the ‘equilibrium’ level by several, even 3–4, hours, if technology and price
factors are taken into account.
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transport, storage, postal services and communications; real es-
tate and business activities; financial services), excluding trade
and repair (see Table IV-1). This was partly due to a plunge in ser-
vices wage inflation and partly to flat-to-rising rates in manufac-
turing wage inflation. This, however, is not considered to be a
cause for concern, against a background of a steady improve-
ment in manufacturing sector competitiveness (see more on the
subject in Section IV/3). It should be noted that in contrast to pre-
vious quarters, there has recently been an upsurge not only in the
blue-collar index, but also in the white-collar wage index. Analy-
sis of the wage levels also reveals that in contrast to steadily rising
wage levels for the manufacturing blue-collar labour force com-
pared with that of other market sector services, wage inflation for
white-collar labour has been flat to falling. This undoubtedly re-
flects the erosion in the position of white-collar office workers
employed in the manufacturing sector in the 1990s. It is possible
that the aforementioned process has now come to an end, and
that the retention and recruitment of qualified white-collar work-
ers (such as production managers, medium-level managers, etc.)
will come to the foreground. This in turn may trigger increases in
manufacturing sector white-collar wage inflation against a back-
drop of high wage inflation in respect of white-collar labour in
services. Further investigation of this issue is in order.
Wage inflation affecting the sector of other services fell to a sig-
nificantly lower level than the 16-18% recorded in the 1998–99
period, reducing the danger of labour market tightening which
was pointed out in previous Reports. This is especially relevant to
the transport, storage, postal services and communications sec-
tor, which produced a very high rate of wage inflation last year. It
should be noted, however, that wage inflation affecting hotels
and restaurants remained at a high rate of over 15%, which may
signal the danger of wage inflation caused by strong demand for
labour against the backdrop of the above-noted buoyant activity
in the sector (see Chart IV-6).
The retail and wholesale trade and repair sector does not
seem to fit in the picture outlined above: the rapidly accelerating
wage inflation reflected in twelve-month indices has remained
far above the private sector average throughout this year (see
Chart IV-7). Statistical analysis, however, reveals that the sector’s
wage inflation in fact peaked in 2000 Q1, with the quar-
ter-on-quarter annualised index obtained after the removal of
seasonal and calendar effects and the statistical noise amounting
to 16% in the first quarter, up from 12–13% last year. However, the
upward trend began to taper off during the second and third
quarters. This high volatility in the twelve-month indices can be
partly attributed to the base-period effect: a comparison of the
first quarters of 2000 and 1999 results in an exceptional
year-on-year rate as the quarterly wage inflation of the sector was
at a low in 1999 Q1. Similarly, although wage inflation slowed
down in 2000 Q2 and Q3, the simple twelve-month indices in-
cluded in the table appear to be high compared with last year’s
low base-period values.
Looking at the sector’s wage inflation from the perspective of
economic theory, there are two noteworthy developments. First
of all, as noted earlier, there was a surge in the number of people
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Table IV-1 Wage inflation
Percentage changes on a year earlier6
1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3
Q1–
Q3
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Q1–
Q3
Manufacturing 16.2 13.4 13.6 14.4 10.7 11.5 15.1 13.3 13.3
Trade 15.4 12.9 12.1 13.5 7.7 15.2 17.5 16.3 16.4
Other private sector services 16.8 13.5 15.1 15.1 13.6 11.1 14.9 12.8 12.9
Private sector 16.3 13.3 13.9 14.5 11.0 11.4 15.1 13.2 13.2
Public sector 16.1 17.7 16.8 16.9 17.2 12.1 9.7 11.9 11.2
Total 16.3 14.6 14.8 15.2 12.9 11.6 13.4 12.8 12.6
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Chart IV-7 Wage inflation rates in the retail and
wholesale trade and repair sector*
Previous quarter = 100
* Annualised quarterly growth rates based on seasonally adjusted series recalculated
for businesses employing over five people.
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Chart IV-6 Wage inflation in the different areas
of the private sector*
Previous quarter = 100
* Annualised quarterly growth rates based on seasonally adjusted series recalculated
for businesses employing over five people.
6 The September 2000 Report contained an error in the data for 1999. Please,
refer to Table IV-1 of this issue for the correct figures.
employed in the sector, simultaneously with an increase in the
hours worked by each person. This implies that the large-scale
restructuring in the Hungarian retail sector over the past two
years, involving the proliferation of large shopping centres and
supermarkets,7 may have run up against tighter labour supply.
Second, this rapid restructuring raises doubts about the possibil-
ity of measuring the sector’s wage inflation i.e. the change in the
price of the same unit of work. This is doubtful because the na-
ture and allocation of the work at the new outlets, as well as em-
ployee efficiency, have, in all likelihood, undergone major
changes, which at least partly explains the ‘odd’ wage patterns
produced by the sector.
2 Capacity utilisation
In 2000 Q3, growth in average capacity utilisation
8 in the manu-
facturing industry continued in terms of the seasonally ad-
justed data, although at a significantly slower pace than previ-
ously. The Hungarian manufacturing industry enjoyed an excep-
tionally high rate of capacity utilisation seen only once before
over the last ten years, in early 1998, against the background of
similarly favourable external sales possibilities (see Chart IV-8).
Once again, dynamic output and export growth were the factors
at work in achieving such a high level of capacity utilisation in the
third quarter. By contrast, investment activity remained weak in
the sector. In 2000 Q3, the relationship between technical capaci-
ties and prospective demand continued to reflect the trend first
seen in mid-1999, reflecting the cyclical position. Excess capaci-
ties relative to prospective orders for the coming 12 months de-
clined, parallel to a rise in the proportion of firms reporting a
shortage of capacities (see Charts IV-9 and IV-10).
In the third quarter, the proportion of firms projecting insuffi-
cient capacities relative to demand over the near term was high in
the construction and machine manufacturing industries, pre-
dominantly affecting large exporters located in Budapest (and vi-
cinity) and in Western Hungary (Transdanubia). The quality and
technological standard of capacities also cause problems for the
aforementioned sectors, but above all for firms in North Hungary
catering to the domestic market, using domestic capital.
3 Competitiveness
In 2000 Q3, the nominal effective exchange rate index of the fo-rint depreciated by 5.8% on a year earlier, thanks not least to
cross exchange rate movements (accounting for roughly 1.5%)
conducive to competitiveness. Despite these favourable cross
exchange rate movements, price-based indicators continued to
be characterised by a trend of real appreciation, which seemed to
be accelerating slightly over the third quarter, relative to the be-
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Chart IV-8 Average capacity utilisation
in manufacturing*
* Seasonally adjusted data. Source: Kopint-Datorg.
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Chart IV-9 Share of manufacturing firms with
a shortage of capacities*
* Seasonally adjusted data. Source: Kopint-Datorg.
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Chart IV-10 Share of manufacturing firms with
a surplus of capacities*
*Seasonally adjusted data. Source: Kopint-Datorg.
7 According to statistics, in August 2000, the number of companies in the sec-
tor employing 50–249 people increased by 49 and the number of those em-
ploying over 250 people went up by 2, relative to a year earlier.
8 The survey used as the source of the above information did not cover a few
large multinational companies with manufacturing operations in Hungary -
which carry exceptional weight on account of their sales revenues. (The Situa-
tion and Short-term Prospects of Manufacturing and Construction Industry En-
terprises in July 2000, a quarterly survey of the business cycle, by
Kopint-Datorg.)
ginning of the year (see Chart IV-11). The CPI-based real ex-
change rate appreciated by 2.2%, relative to a year ago, simulta-
neously with an appreciation of 5.5% in the real exchange rate
based on the manufacturing price index. This was again due to
the composition effect arising from the different structures of
Hungarian and foreign price indices, as noted in previous Reports
(March 2000, June 2000 and September 2000). Our analyses
show that the magnitude of the composition effect was around
2.4% over the course of 2000. Therefore, the manufacturing
price-based real exchange rate index, from which the composi-
tion effect is removed and which is more correct from both a the-
oretical and statistical point of view, appreciated by roughly
2.9–3%, instead of 5.3%. The trend of real appreciation can also
be clearly seen on the basis of this adjusted indicator, although
with a considerably smaller magnitude than that of the main indi-
cator.
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Chart IV-11 Real exchange rates based on the CPI
and the manufacturing price index
Box IV-2 Composition effect within the manufacturing price-based real exchange rate
Clarity and suitability for analysis are crucial criteria which statistical indicators must fulfil. In respect of real exchange
rates – which compare domestic and “imaginary composite”, so-called effective foreign producers’ (consumers’)
prices and costs – this means that the same concept should be applied when taking account of domestic and foreign
producers. The desired real exchange rate indicator based on manufacturing prices seeks to measure, using produc-
ers’ selling prices, the size of market shares producers can acquire via the price changes (see Kovács (1998)9). Obvi-
ously, in addition to its own or other domestic producers’ prices, an individual producer’s decisions will also depend
on foreign producers’ prices expressed in terms of the domestic currency. Therefore, individual producers’ decision
making is influenced by their own “real exchange rates”. It can be seen thus that the aggregate real exchange rate re-
lating to the economy (or the manufacturing industry) as a whole is derived via weighing together these individual
real exchange rates. This means that when deriving the aggregate indicator, the correct theoretical approach is to use
an identical system of weights for individual foreign and domestic prices.
This problem is of no particular significance, unless there are considerable differences between the sales struc-
tures of the economies being compared. The Hungarian and foreign manufacturing sectors appear to have different
structures. This is partly due to methodology discrepancies in the available price indices and partly to the different
sectoral composition of the Hungarian and foreign manufacturing industry. As a result of these two effects, the share
of the chemical and food industry is considerably higher and that of machine manufacturing is considerably lower
than in the foreign price indices. This becomes a problem
when there is significant relative price change. In such cases
the pronounced rises or falls in a particular sector’s relative
prices will have a different impact on domestic and foreign in-
dices, even if the degree of relative price change is identical
both in Hungary and abroad. An example of this type of rela-
tive price change took place in the chemical sector due to ris-
ing oil prices seen since early 1999 (see previous Reports).
Higher-than-average chemical price rises caused the manufac-
turing-price-based real exchange rate to appreciate more
strongly than the indicator corrected for the composition ef-
fect. The recent rise in food prices and machine industry
prices, growing at a relatively slow pace, introduced a similar
distortion into the index.
Chart IV-12 shows the traditionally calculated and the com-
position-effect-free indicators. It can be seen that although the
short-term movements in the two indices do not diverge con-
siderably, looking at the average of several years, the index un-
adjusted for the composition effect tends to be appreciating at a systematically higher rate than the corrected index.
The difference between the two indices is approximately one percentage point as an average of one year.
In order to improve the clarity of theoretical and statistical interpretation, from the next Report on, the National
Bank of Hungary is adopting the indicator adjusted for the composition effect.
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Chart IV-12 The original and reweighted real effective
exchange rate based on manufacturing wholesale
prices
9 NBH Working Papers.
The unit labour cost-based indicator depreciated by 3.7% for
the year as a whole. Second-quarter production-side GDP data,
recently released by the Central Statistical Office, reflect slower
improvement over the previous two quarters than that noted in
previous Reports (4.3%, compared with 6.2% noted earlier). The
recent GDP data suggest that growth in domestic unit labour
costs accelerated during 2000. While the rate of productivity
growth has been steadily declining since 2000 Q1, nominal wage
growth remained virtually unchanged during the year, thanks
primarily to the fact that annual inflation expectations did not
fall.10 The increasingly faster growth of unit labour costs was,
however, offset by a faster depreciation of the nominal effective
exchange rate index, due to favourable cross exchange rate ef-
fects. All in all, the unit labour cost-based real exchange rate in-
dex has been depreciating during the course of the year at a
steady, although slightly lower-than-estimated, rate (see Chart
IV-13).
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based on manufacturing unit labour costs
10 It should be noted that the indicators of competitiveness have been calcu-
lated relying on the uncorrected manufacturing wage indices provided by the
CSO. The main methodology reason for this is that the calculation of unit la-
bour costs does not require a correction for working hours since the hours
worked are represented both in the wage cost and the productivity indices.
Due to corrections arising from the applied methodology, the manufacturing
wage data analysed here are not identical to the indices computed in the sec-
tion on the labour market.
1 Net saving position
Persistently high world prices for energy had an adverse im-pact on Hungary’s external balance, and the nominal deficit
on the balance of trade recorded within the structure of gross do-
mestic product1 rose to 2.2% of GDP, as a result of a deterioration
in the terms of trade.2 Developments in 2000 Q3 also reflect the
economy’s accommodation to external market conditions. The
deficit on the balance of trade at constant prices3 fell by about
0.1%, to 0.9% as a proportion of GDP, in a year-on-year compari-
son. Export performance was fuelled by stronger foreign de-
mand. The subdued growth of the real-economy use of foreign
assets is attributable to the fact that the investment growth rate,
which is relatively import intensive, stood 2.4 percentage points
below the rate of economic growth, with the expansion in the
volume of consumption also only approximating that rate. The
favourable demand structure (in terms of equilibrium) seen since
mid-1999 did not offset the price losses caused by the worsening
in the terms of trade. The trade balance deterioration reached an
all-time peak in 2000 Q3,4 which could not be offset by the Hun-
garian economy, thus the nominal balance of trade worsened by
1.7 percentage points as a proportion of GDP. The adverse price
structure and the projected stronger growth in investment spend-
ing over the near term would imply an increase in external fi-
nancing. Nevertheless, the actual data and structural changes do
not rule out the chance that the rise in external financing will not
exceed the sustainable rate, even in the face of stronger invest-
ment demand. The justification for such hopes lies in the fact that
the increase in the import requirement triggered by stronger do-
mestic demand is likely to be curbed by the high level of im-
ported inventories, which may enable export revenues to grow
at a faster pace than imports. Another factor pointing to this sce-
nario is that Hungary’s main trading partners still enjoy buoyant,
though somewhat slowing, business activity. However, the con-
dition for any improvement in Hungarian prospects is that the
deterioration in the terms of trade, which is worsening equilib-
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1 Exports and imports as recorded in the National Accounts.
2 In this section 1/V, the base period used for the analysis is the same quarter of
a year earlier as a means of removing seasonal effects.
3 Values calculated at 1995 constant prices, reflecting changes in the volume
index of GDP.
4 Divergence between the growth rates of export and import prices (‘ – ‘ values
reflect a deterioration in the terms of trade):
1999 Q3 1999 Q4 2000 Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3
–1,6 –2,0 –2,3 –2,8 –3,2
rium, moderates. Further worsening would raise the need for
government policy response to help restore equilibrium.
Against the backdrop of a nominal deterioration in the bal-
ance5 of trade, the third quarter saw a rise in profit repatriation
through foreign residents’ current transfers,6 as a natural conse-
quence of the steady rise in foreign ownership shares. The com-
bined increase in the trade balance deficit and the net profit out-
flow (1.7%+1.0%) raised the country’s net financing requirement
to roughly 3.4% of GDP. This deterioration even interrupted the
formerly falling trend in the deficit on the current account of the
balance of payments (see Chart V-1).
The shift in the distribution of disposable income8 among
agents relative to 1999 continues to be an active factor. The main
difference seems to lie in the timing of distribution. In the first
half of 1999, government receipts fell short of the projected level,
simultaneously with unscheduled budgetary expenses, putting
temporary upward pressure on private sector9 income. The sec-
ond half of the year was characterised by correction and tighten-
ing. The timing of the income distribution in 2000 has been simi-
lar to that seen in previous years, but in the third quarter, there
was a further increase in the disposable income of the general
government (see Table V-1). This is because budgetary revenues
this year have outstripped expectations, due partly to robust eco-
nomic growth in addition to more stringent tax regulations and
partly to higher-than-expected inflation, which was followed by
expenditure changes only after a lag. Due to these effects, data
on one single quarter do not enable far-reaching conclusions to
be drawn about changes in the income position of the various
sectors of the economy. This is not possible because the general
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5 Balance of trade based on the structure of GDP.
6 Within foreign current transfer payments, the external balance was wors-
ened by both profit repatriation and unrequited transfers. The
GDP-proportional deficit on the net foreign market transfer balance peaked
relative to the same periods in previous years.
7 The discrepancy between the published and the theoretical current account
of the balance of payments stems from the fact that the Hungarian balance of
payments statistics are still based on the cash-flow concept. This implies that
they ignore transactions between Hungarian residents and foreign residents
where there are no money flows involved. Furthermore, it may also occur that
money flows that can be seen as revaluation in terms of economic theory are
recorded as transactions. Another factor to blame for the discrepancy is that
there may be a timing difference between real transactions and payment
flows. The smaller the measured interval, the larger the relative discrepancy,
i.e. the size of the difference between the data measured in terms of the accru-
als concept and those based on the cash-flow concept, as is illustrated by the
quarterly data in the balance of payments current account and the net external
financing requirement.
8 As a change from previous Inflation Reports, the Hungarian Privatisation
and State Holding Company (ÁPV Rt.) is no longer recorded in the corporate
data section, but within the general government data. This is because the APV
Rt. is engaged in quasi fiscal operations and is also treated by official (CSO)
statistics as part of the general government. (The fact that until now the Bank
did not fully rely on the official statistics in the ‘savings and investment bal-
ances’ was due to an absence of sufficient information.) Recently there have
emerged other justifications grounded in economic theory in support of the
transfer of the APV Rt. Until now, the Agency’s operations were much more
balanced and its expenditure was funded by its privatisation revenues. With
these resources beginning to dry up, the importance of central budget reallo-
cation has strengthened, bringing about major fluctuations in the income po-
sitions of the two types of public organizations. This may also conceal the real
role of the general government in controlling demand. The consolidated com-
bined balance shows a more balanced impact.
9 Denoting financial and non-financial companies and households.
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Net financing requirement
Current account
1998 1999
Per cent Per cent
1995 1996 20001997
Chart V-1 Seasonally adjusted net financing
requirement and current account deficit
as a percentage of GDP*
* Net financing requirement denotes the saving – investment balance of the econ-
omy adjusted for inflation, which in turn defines a theoretical current account bal-
ance.7
government is expected to expand demand during the fourth
quarter as a result of an expected rise in current transfer pay-
ments and capital transfers, which will entail a rise in the govern-
ment’s financing requirement. For the year as a whole, however,
general government will have a demand-contracting impact.
The third quarter saw a rise in households’ net financing ca-
pacity, at 3.4% as a proportion of GDP, as total spending grew at a
slower pace than income. This is partly explained by the
base-period effect, as 1999 witnessed a pronounced deteriora-
tion in households’ net financing position. This was followed by
a major shift in saving patterns when households began to re-
duce their substantial financial savings accumulated in previous
years and stepped up their real investments. The relative decline
in investment spending as a proportion of GDP seen this year is
attributable to high base-period values. The household sector
continues to be characterised by a high rate of consumer spend-
ing, which tends to expand faster than disposable income.
Therefore, when the base-period effect of investment spending
wears out and the effect of government subsidies to home build-
ing projects kicks in, households’ financial savings are likely to
decline further over the forthcoming period. The robust growth
in household sector borrowing is a sign of the aforementioned
process. In addition to real income growth, this trend is also be-
ing supported by the development of money markets, which fa-
cilitates the restructuring of households’ financial assets towards
a portfolio marked by a higher debt-to-income ratio.
Corporate profitability continued to follow an upward trend,
thanks to buoyant activity, but its rate of growth fell short of that
of GDP. The level of companies’ own financial assets was af-
fected by a number of temporary and contradictory factors, caus-
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Table V-1 Inflation-adjusted saving and investment by sectors as a percentage of GDP *
1998 1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year Q1 Q2 Q3
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
+ net income transfers –2.9 –5.4 –3.2 –4.3 –4.0 –2.1 –4.1 –2.6 –4.8 –3.5 –2.1 –5.9 –3.4
+ unrequited transfers 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.1
Disposable income 98.8 96.8 99.4 97.8 98.2 99.6 97.8 99.7 97.2 98.5 100.0 96.5 98.8
– households 72.8 69.4 70.9 70.8 70.9 75.3 70.3 70.9 69.9 71.4 74.0 69.1 71.3
– corporate sector 14.7 15.1 16.4 13.3 14.8 16.0 16.9 16.5 10.4 14.8 12.9 15.6 13.6
– public sector 11.3 12.4 12.0 13.7 12.4 8.3 10.6 12.3 16.9 12.3 13.1 11.8 13.8
Final consumption 75.4 71.6 71.3 71.8 72.4 77.8 73.2 72.6 71.9 73.7 77.2 72.8 73.5
–household consumption 64.8 61.4 61.3 61.9 62.3 66.6 63.1 63.0 62.5 63.7 66.4 62.9 64.0
–public consumption 10.6 10.2 10.0 9.9 10.2 11.2 10.2 9.6 9.4 10.0 10.8 9.9 9.5
Gross savings** 23.4 25.2 28.1 26.0 25.7 21.8 24.6 27.1 25.3 24.8 22.8 23.7 25.3
–households 8.0 8.0 9.6 8.9 8.7 8.7 7.2 7.9 7.4 7.8 7.7 6.1 7.3
–corporate sector 14.7 15.1 16.4 13.3 14.8 16.0 16.9 16.5 10.4 14.8 12.9 15.6 13.6
–public sector 0.7 2.2 2.0 3.8 2.2 –2.9 0.4 2.7 7.5 2.2 2.3 1.9 4.4
Net capital transfers
–households 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5
–corporate sector 1.0 1.0 1.2 2.2 1.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 2.0 1.2 1.8 1.0 0.9
–public sector –1.4 –1.3 –1.4 –2.3 –1.6 –1.0 –1.2 –1.5 –2.3 –1.5 –2.1 –1.3 –1.3
Investment 26.9 30.4 30.4 30.7 29.7 26.5 29.4 27.9 30.8 28.8 27.7 29.5 28.7
–household investment 5.8 3.1 4.1 3.8 4.2 5.2 5.2 5.8 4.2 5.1 5.6 4.7 4.3
–corporate investment and inventories 18.2 23.3 23.0 22.1 21.7 18.8 21.3 18.7 20.6 19.9 19.5 22.4 20.8
–public investment 2.9 4.0 3.3 4.7 3.8 2.6 2.9 3.3 6.0 3.8 2.6 2.5 3.6
Net foreign financing requirement –3.5 –5.2 –2.3 –4.6 –3.9 –4.7 –4.9 –0.7 –5.5 –4.0 –4.9 –5.9 –3.4
Financing capacity of households 2.6 5.2 5.7 5.2 4.7 3.9 2.2 2.4 3.5 3.0 2.4 1.8 3.4
Corporate sector financing requirement –2.4 –7.2 –5.3 –6.6 –5.5 –2.1 –3.5 –1.0 –8.2 –3.9 –4.8 –5.8 –6.2
Public sector financing requirement –3.6 –3.2 –2.7 –3.2 –3.2 –6.5 –3.6 –2.1 –0.8 –3.1 –2.4 –1.9 –0.6
Notes: Bank estimates. Due to rounding, the individual figures do not sum up to the rounded totals.
* Indicators approximate the accruals concept. Savings do not contain forint effects from exchange rate changes on household deposit and credit portfolios. Interest expenditure in the general government balance
(GFS deficit less proceeds of privatisation) is presented using the accruals concept.
** Gross saving = disposable income (gross, i.e. including the value for depreciation in the given year) less final consumption. The State Privatisation and Holding Company is part of the public sector.
Disposable income includes the sum of the gross domestic product for the given period and the balance of the income transfers and unrequited transfers to non-residents and by non-residents to Hungary (according
to balance-of-payments statistics).
ing their GDP-proportional disposable income to fall 3% below
the level for the same period last year. Available data suggest an
increase in costs. In addition to the adverse effect of the terms of
trade on profitability, nominal wage costs also rose at a
faster-than-expected pace. At the same time, rising productivity
levels successfully offset most of these extra costs. The
third-quarter level of firms’ own financial assets were reduced by
an increase in current transfers by foreign residents, in addition
to restrictive general government policy in respect of the income
relations between the government and the corporate sector (due
presumably to deferred payments of current and capital transfers
during the year). However, this restricting impact seemed to ease
somewhat during the third quarter. In the final quarter of 2000,
the general government is expected to expand demand. Accord-
ing to Bank estimates, this may cause corporate disposable in-
come to increase at a rate exceeding that of GDP for the remain-
der of the year (for the year as a whole, this rate may be propor-
tionate with GDP growth).
Corporate financing requirement increased, due to a rise in
the sector’s GDP-proportionate investment spending at current
prices, in addition to the aforementioned effects. Factors to
blame for the increase include changes in the price structure
pushing up expenses10 and a rise in inventories. Although corpo-
rate investment growth lost momentum in volume terms, invest-
ment spending at current prices increased as a proportion of
GDP.11 During the remainder of the year the income relations be-
tween the central budget and companies may change in a way
that could improve corporate sector disposable income. This
may enable companies to control or even curb the level of their
financing requirement, even along with their stronger invest-
ment activity over the near term.
In sum, the increase in the external financing requirement in
2000 Q3 was due to an approximately 2.8% rise in the pri-
vate-sector borrowing requirement, as the improvement in
households’ financing capacity took place with stronger growth
in companies’ borrowing requirement. The approximately 1%
improvement in the fiscal position mitigated this adverse impact
on the external balance, but even the relatively tight fiscal stance
failed to offset the effect of the unfavourable foreign market
prices.
2 Current account
and its financing
In 2000 Q3, the deficit on the current account of the balance ofpayments amounted to EUR 126 million (see Table V-2). Al-
though the strongly improving trend in the balance of services re-
mained unbroken, the balance of goods turned down signifi-
cantly, feeding through to the trend of total real-economy trans-
actions. As far as the balance of transfers is concerned, steady
growth in net outflows of income generated on non-debt invest-
ments exerted downward pressure on the trend (see Chart V-2).
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10 While the investment price index was lower than the GDP deflator in 1999, it
was higher in 2000 Q3.
11 From 15% in 1999 Q3 to 16%.
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Table V-2 The current account
EUR millions
1999
Q2
2000
Q3
Change
1999
Q1–Q3
2000
Q1–Q3
Change
l Goods –471 –562 –91 –1,441 –1,500 –59
Credit (exports) 5,134 6,956 1,823 14,565 19,799 5,234
Debt (imports) 5,605 7,518 1,913 16,006 21,299 5,293
2 Services 592 749 158 972 1,527 555
Travel, net 759 907 147 1,588 1,954 366
Other services, net –168 –157 11 –616 –427 189
3 Incomes –293 –418 –125 –953 –1,368 –415
On debt, net –114 –248 –134 –404 –762 –358
On non-debt, net –179 –171 –8 –553 –608 –56
Wages, net 1 1 0 3 3 –1
4 Current transfers 103 105 2 225 355 130
Current account
(1+2+3+4) –70 –126 –56 –1,197 –986 211
Although combined data on the first three quarters reflect a better
position on the current account of the balance of payments than
last year, shifts in the trend seem to foreshadow a downturn dur-
ing the final quarter.
Chart V-3 clearly shows that the seasonally adjusted deficit on
the current account of the balance of payments in the third quar-
ter was unfavourable, a fact reflected in the rapid deterioration in
the trend. It should be pointed out nevertheless, that the interpre-
tation of end-of-period data requires a certain amount of caution.
It is clear from the chart that the current account trend already
worsened during the second quarter, though the previous issue
reported an improving trend. Developments are primarily influ-
enced by deterioration in the balance of trade – as a delayed ef-
fect of the trend which has already surfaced in the customs statis-
tics – and the rise in income transfers generated on non-debt in-
vestments.
The improving trend in the balance of services and debt-type
income transfers, as well as the flat trend in current unrequited
transfers were not sufficient to offset the substantial downturn in
the trend of the above factors.
The financing of the third-quarter deficit on the current ac-
count of the balance of payments was characterised by waning
non-debt-generating net capital inflows (EUR 92 million), while
debt-type investments exhibited net capital outflows (see Chart
V-4 and Table V-3).
In respect of non-debt-generating items, net equity purchases
and the acquisition of ownership stakes within foreign direct in-
vestment amounted to EUR 320 million as a result of an inflow of
EUR 519 million and an outflow of EUR 199 million. This greatly
exceeded the deficit on current account in its own right. The
nearly EUR 200 million direct investment by Hungarian resident
businesses abroad in the course of one quarter was outstanding,
but it can be traced back to one single exceptionally large trans-
action. It should be also noted that prior to this transaction, but
still during the third quarter, there was additional capital raised of
nearly the same size by the foreign owner of the Hungarian firm
which then made the major investment. Thus, the transactions
mentioned did not significantly influence net foreign direct in-
vestment flows. Net portfolio equity purchases abroad com-
prised an outflow (EUR 229 million), slightly smaller than that in
the previous quarter (EUR 258 million). This involved uninter-
ruptedly strong net equity purchases abroad by Hungarian resi-
dents, at nearly EUR 60 million, while the value of foreign resi-
dents’ third-quarter sales of Hungarian equities amounted to EUR
170 million in net terms.
A look at the distribution of securities transactions12 highlights
a change relative to the second quarter. In 2000 Q3, purely finan-
cial enterprises constituted the largest domestic equity purchas-
ers (above all, insurance companies and pension funds), while in
the previous quarter non-financial and financial businesses
bought Hungarian equities from foreign investors in an equal
share. What is assumed to have taken place during the previous
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12 Comparison is made difficult by the fact that in respect of equities only se-
curities traded on the stock exchange are recorded in the securities statistics,
whereas the balance of payments also includes the turnover in OTC markets.
Furthermore, the statistics on securities do not differentiate between transac-
tions in terms of direct investment and portfolio investment.
Table V-3 Financing the current account
EUR millions
1999
Q3
2000
Q3
Change
1999
Q1–Q3
2000
Q1–Q3
Change
(1) Current account deficit 70 126 56 1,197 986 –211
(2) Total financing –117 –21 96 1,534 809 –725
– non-debt (=2b.1+2c.1) 338 92 –246 1,822 592 –1229
– debt (=2a+2b.2+2c.2) –455 –113 342 –288 216 504
(2a) NBH and the government
(=2a.1+2a.2) –901 –498 403 –623 –623 0
(2a.1) Debt transactions –196 249 445 649 247 –403
– o/w government
securities 51 237 186 189 819 630
(2a.2) International reserves –705 –747 –42 –1,273 –870 403
(2b) Private sector
(=2b.1+2b.2) 437 101 –336 1,265 150 –1,115
(2b.1) Equity transactions 96 –229 –324 902 –438 –1,340
– Credit institutions 10 –12 –22 5 60 55
– Corporate sectors 85 –216 –302 897 –498 –1,395
(2b.2) Debt transactions 341 329 –12 363 588 225
– Credit institutions 141 476 335 –18 1,120 1,138
– Corporate sectors 200 –147 –347 381 –532 –914
(2c) Direct investment
(=2c.1+2c.2) 347 376 30 893 1,282 389
(2c.1) Equity capital 242 320 78 920 1,030 110
– in Hungary 279 519 240 1,053 1,271 219
– Abroad –37 –199 –162 –133 –241 –109
(2c.2) Intercompany loans 104 56 –48 –27 252 279
– in Hungary 109 45 –63 –13 253 265
– Abroad –4 11 15 –15 –1 14
(3) Capital account 95 93 –2 –38 177 215
NEO (=1–2–3) 92 54 –38 –299 0 299
* Portfolio and other investments.
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Chart V-3 The current account
quarter is that Hungarian subsidiaries of foreign multinational
companies bought their own shares on a large scale, which re-
sulted in a high rate of net equity purchases by non-financial en-
terprises.
The significance of such transactions declined during the third
quarter, and low market prices also attracted some Hungarian fi-
nancial corporate buyers. The factors to blame for the with-
drawal of foreign residents and the plunge in the Hungarian
share index include, apart from global stock-market uncertainty,
government interference with the pricing of certain leading firms
whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange, weak or disap-
pointing corporate performance in the second quarter and
the explicit economic and legal difficulties facing a number of
firms.
A noteworthy development in respect of debt-type financing
was an upsurge in government securities sales to non-residents
(EUR 237 million), as the foreign exchange borrowing transac-
tions of the National Bank and the government (public sector)
cancelled one another out. Although the third quarter (end-July
and mid-August) saw a repayment of medium-term loans total-
ling EUR 460 million, while there were no new loans undertaken,
this outflow was roughly offset by short-term portfolio financing
and other investments.
The approximately EUR 750 million transactions-based in-
crease in international reserves was derived broadly as the differ-
ence between conversion-type foreign exchange purchases of
EUR 815 million and net interest charges of EUR 70 million paid
by the Bank.
Following a downward trend during the second quarter, pri-
vate sector borrowing picked up during the third quarter. Credit
institutions used foreign exchange funds primarily to step up the
amount of financing loans to the corporate sector. Thus, there
was only a minor change in their on-balance-sheet foreign ex-
change positions.
Decline in forward contracts and the long forward-exchange
position itself led to relatively faster quarterly growth in the bank-
ing sector’s forint position. The corporate sector used the foreign
exchange loans extended by the domestic banking sector pre-
dominantly to boost its short-term trade credit abroad, which
was probably needed in order to facilitate the rapid settlement of
the larger import account abroad. In respect of intercompany
loans there was a net capital inflow of EUR 56 million during the
quarter.
This was definitely below average, especially in view of the
fact that the servicing of intercompany loans related to Hungar-
ian businesses abroad exceeded new loan extension by EUR 11
million, reducing by that amount the net inflow recorded in the
line of intercompany loans extended to the Hungarian subsidiar-
ies.
The capital account, comprising transactions in unrequited
capital transfers, non-produced and non-financial assets,
showed a surplus of EUR 93 million in the third quarter.
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3 International investment
position
There was a minor shift in the net international investment po-sition, bringing down net foreign liabilities from EUR 30.9
billion at end-June to EUR 30.5 billion at end-September (see Ta-
ble V-4). Net foreign liabilities in the form of non-debt elements
continued to decrease. Although the stock of foreign direct in-
vestment rose at a rate in excess of Hungarian outward FDI, this
was overcompensated by the net outflow via the portfolio equity
investment channel. In comparison with EUR 19.2 billion in the
previous quarter, the non-debt elements of third-quarter net for-
eign liabilities stood at EUR 19 billion. There was also a drop
(from EUR 11.7 billion to EUR 11.4 billion) in debt-type net for-
eign liabilities (see Chart V-5). Net foreign debt calculated exclu-
sive of foreigners’ forint-denominated government security
holdings and intercompany loans fell to EUR 5.9 billion by the
end of the quarter. The rise in international reserves was particu-
larly sharp, up from EUR 11 billion in the second quarter to EUR
12 billion at the end of the third quarter.
Non-debt foreign assets continued to rise in 2000 Q3, with
Hungarian residents’ foreign direct investments excluding
intercompany loans rising to EUR 1.8 billion and portfolio equity
investment to over EUR 200 million. The stock of FDI in Hungary
excluding intercompany loans rose from EUR 17 billion to
17.4 billion, while portfolio equity holdings fell from EUR 3.8 bil-
lion to 3.6 billion. As movements in the stock market index ap-
peared to be less rhapsodic over the period under review than in
the second quarter, (stuck within the 7,923–8,654 range, showing
relatively moderate daily shifts and nearly identical values at the
two end-points of the period) changes in prices account for only
a relatively small portion of the decline in holdings, and it sounds
more probable that the figures reflect the effect of net transac-
tions (of minus EUR 170 million).
The debt-type net investment position also declined, as a re-
sult of slower growth in foreign liabilities than in foreign assets
(above all, the international reserves). On both the liabilities and
assets sides the sharpest rise took place in the category of other
investments, with the former reflected in an increase in bank-
ing-sector liabilities and the latter in the rise of corporate-sector
foreign deposits (as already noted in the section on financing).
A significant part of the increases came from revaluation, due to
cross-exchange-rate changes (in respect of gross and net foreign
debt this amounted to nearly EUR 1 billion and EUR 300 million,
respectively).
Total debt-type investments (excluding forint-denominated
government securities and intercompany loans) constitute net
foreign-exchange-denominated foreign debt. As a result of the
jump in the National Bank’s foreign assets (above all, the interna-
tional reserves), this debt dropped from EUR 6.5 billion in 2000
Q2 to EUR 5.9 billion in the third quarter. As a result of a slight fall
in net government debt, claims on foreign residents at the end of
the third quarter for the public sector as a whole exceeded liabili-
ties. The fact that the high rate of banking-sector external bor-
rowing could not be offset by companies’ foreign debt servicing
exerted upward pressure on net private sector foreign debt (see
Table V-5). Gross foreign debt rose to EUR 26.8 billion, shared in
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* Excluding government securities held by foreigners and intercompany loans.
Table V-4 International investment position
EUR millions
1999 2000
Dec. June Sep.
Net international investment position (=1–2) –30.4 –30.9 –30.5
– non-debt(=1a.1+1b.1–2a.1–2b.1) –19.1 –19.2 –19.0
– debt (=1a.2+1b.2+1c+1d–2a.2–2b.2–2c) –11.3 –11.7 –11.4
(1)Foreign assets (=1a+..+1d) 19.1 20.7 23.1
(1a) Direct investment abroad 1.6 1.7 2.0
(1a.1) Equity capital 1.4 1.5 1.8
(1a.2) Other capital (intercompany loans) 0.2 0.3 0.2
(1b) Portfolio investment 1.2 1.7 2.1
(1b.1) Equity securities 0.1 0.1 0.2
(1b.2) Debt securities 1.2 1.6 1.9
(1c) Other investment 5.6 6.2 6.9
(1d) International reserves 10.8 11.0 12.0
(2) Foreign liabilities (=2a+..+2c) 49.5 51.6 53.5
(2a) Direct investment in Hungary 19.1 20.2 20.7
(2a.1) Equity capital 16.2 17.0 17.4
(2a.2) Other capital (intercompany loans) 2.9 3.2 3.3
(2b) Portfolio investment 16.9 16.2 16.4
(2b.1) Equity securities 4.3 3.8 3.6
(2b.2) Debt securities 12.6 12.4 12.8
(2c) Other liabilities 13.5 15.2 16.4
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
(M) Government securities held by foreigners 1.7 2.3 2.5
Gross foreign debt* (=2b.2+2c–M) 24.4 25.3 26.8
Net foreign debt* (=2b.2+2c–M–1b.2–1c–1d) 6.9 6.5 5.9
* Excluding non-Hungarian residents’ holdings of government securities and intercompany
loans.
equal parts between the public and the private sector. The pro-
nounced rise in this value relative to the previous quarter can be
attributed to revaluation affecting other investments, due to cross
exchange rate changes.
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Table V-5 Composition of foreign debt* by sectors
December 1999 June 2000 September 2000
EUR
billions
%
EUR
billions
%
EUR
billions
%
(1) Gross foreign debt
(=1a+1b) 24.4 100.0 25.3 100.0 26.8 100.0
(1a) NBH and government 13.4 54.9 13.1 51.7 13.6 50.9
NBH 9.8 40.0 9.2 36.2 9.9 36.8
Government 3.7 15.0 3.9 15.5 3.8 14.1
(1b) Private sector 11.0 45.1 12.2 48.3 13.1 49.1
Credit institutions 5.5 22.6 5.9 23.3 6.3 23.4
Corporate sector 5.5 22.4 6.3 25.0 6.9 25.7
(2) Net foreign debt
(=2a+2b) 6.9 100.0 6.5 100.0 5.9 100.0
(2a) NBH and Government 1.3 19.3 0.7 10.1 –0.2 –3.7
NBH –1.9 –26.8 –2.8 –43.6 –3.5 –59.7
Government 3.2 46.1 3.5 53.7 3.3 56.0
(2b) Private sector 5.6 80.7 5.8 89.9 6.2 103.7
Credit institutions 2.0 28.3 2.6 39.6 3.1 51.7
Corporate sector 3.6 52.4 3.3 50.3 3.1 52.0
* Excluding government securities held by foreigners and intercompany loans..
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